?.A 


SYLLABUS 


-OF — 


PROF.    PATTWS    LECTURES 


-ON- 


THEISM 


PRUTTBE,     2&OT    p-JBLISKBD- 


1893. 


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i2^jlJC^-^ 


THEISM. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

Theism  may  be  considered  religiously  or  philosophically. 
From  the  standpoint  of  religious  belief  men  may  be  regarded 
as  believing  or  not  believing  in  God. 


Thus :  f  Polytheism. 

par  excellence. 


1.  Theism.  <  Pantheism. 

]  T.J-       ,v   .  f         Theism 

I  Monotheism.  =  < 


2.  Atheism. 

Theism,  philosophically  considered,  is  a  theory  of  the 
universe  affirming  the  existence  of  one  Infinite  Personal 
God ;  the  Creator,  Preserver,  and  Ruler  of  the  Universe. 
The  theistic  conception  of  the  universe  implies  three  things  : 

1.  A  finite,  personal,  and  permanent  self;  or  ego. 

2.  A  totality  of  objective  phenomena;  or  cosmos. 

3.  An  infinite  personal  author  of  all  dependent  existence ; 

or  God. 

Opposed  to  Theism  in  this  view  of  the  subject  would  stand 
Anti-theism  in  its  various  forms. 

Adopting  this  philosophical  conception  of  Theism,  we 
shall  carry  on  the  discussion  under  three  main  divisions : 
Historical ;  Constructive  ;  Polemic. 

PART  I.     HISTORICAL. 

Three  topics  fall  under  this  head : 

1.  The  phenomenology  of  Theism. 

2.  The  genesis  of  Theism. 

3.  The  discussion  of  Theism. 

I.     The  Phenomenology  of  Theism. 

A.  The  Theism  of  the  three  great  historic  monotheistic 
religions:    Mohammedanism,  Christianity,  Judaism. 

The  discussion  here  concerns  the  purely  monotheistic 
character  of  Judaism.  This  has  been  attacked — though  as 
Ochler  (Theo.  of  0.  T.  ii.  150)  shews,  without  success — by 


2 

attempting  to  prove  (a)  That  the  unity  of  God  gradually  un- 
wound itself  from  a  polytheistic  religion,  and  (h)  that  even 
the  Mosaic  Jehovah  does  not  exclude  the  existence  of  other 
gods.  The  plain  facts  o\'  the  O.  T.  regarding  Theism  and 
Polytheism  seem  to  be  these  : 

1.  A  people  surrounded  by  Polytheism  made  the  pupils 

of  God  in  regard  to  a  monotheistic  faith. 

2.  A  perpetual  tendency  to  relapse  into  idolatry  or  Poly- 

theism. 

3.  A  monotheistic  emphasis  given  in  the  decalogue  and 

whole  Mosaic  eultus. 
Original  Jewish  Monotheism  cannot  be  attacked,  except 
upon  the  basis  of  the  following  foregone  conclusions: 

a.  That  all  religion  was  originally  based  on  an  animistic 

view  of  nature. 

b.  That  a  complex  religious  system  must  be  the  fruit  of 

a  long  process  of  development. 

c.  That  consequently  the  books  of  Moses  are  not  earlier 

than  the  period  of  the  monarchy,  if  they  are  not  post- 
exilic. 
With  these  postulates  Kuenen   interprets   the   religious 
type  of  the  Jews  in  the  eighth  century  B.  C.  as  exhibiting 
three  phases : 

a.  The  uncompromising  Monotheism 

of  the  prophets. 
/9.  A  lax  public  sentiment,  seen  in  a 
disposition    to    break   away   from 
Monotheism. 
y.  A  compromising  religious  system, 
stipulating  only  against  the  rivalry, 
without  denying  the  existence,  of 
other  gods. 
The  minute  discussion  and  refutation  of  this  view  belongs 
to  Biblical  Theology. 

B.  The  Theism  of  comparative  Theology. 
According  to  this  view,  pure  Theism  is  the  residuum  after 
eliminating  the  differentiating  elements  of  the  great  historic 
religions.  The  most  systematic  effort  to  give  expression  to 
this  form  of  belief  is  found  in  the  Brahmo-Somaj,  of  India. 
The  recent  schism  in  these  theistic  churches  and  the  forma- 
tion of  a  mystical  party,  is  proof  of  the  unsatisfactory  value 
of  mere  Theism. 


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3 

C.  The  Theism  of  speculative  philosophy. 
According  to  which  God  is  regarded  simply  as  a  hypo- 
thesis for  giving  rational  explanation  of  the  universe. 

II.     The  Genesis  of  Theism. 

There  are  four  generic  theories  in  explanation  of  our  idea 
of  God,  namely  : 

1.  Development.  2.  Revelation. 

8.  Inference.  4.  Intuition. 

These  are  to  be  considered  in  their  order. 

First  Theory.    Development. 

By  which  is  meant  that  Monotheism  sustains  genetic  re- 
lations to  antecedent  impure  or  less  pure  forms  of  b< 
This  theory  assumes  several  forms. 

A.     Hume. 

Polytheism,  according  to  H.,  is  prior  to  Monotheism. 
The  advance  out  of  the  one  into  the  other  is  not  due  to 
philosophic  reflection  and  a  growing  appreciation  of  the 
unity  of  nature,  but  is  explained  by  the  tendency  to  flatter 
a  local  deity,  to  impute  greatness,  and  so  by  degrees  to  in- 
vest him  with  the  attribute  of  infinity.  A  view  lacking 
every  element  of  plausibility,  and  speculatively  worthless. 

B.     Compte. 

The  theory  under  notice  is  credited  to  Compte,  not  because 
he  is  the  originator  of  the  term  fetich,  nor  yet  because  he 
has  given  the  best  account  of  fetichistic  religions — for  this 
distinction  is  due  to  F.  Schultze,  (Fetichismus) — but  because 
Compte  first  presented  in  reasoned  form  the  doctrine  that 
all  religion  begins  in  Fetichism  and  passes  thence  through 
Polytheism  to  Monotheism.  Discussing  the  fetich-theory 
of  religion  (1)  inquire  into  the  origin  and  meaning  of  the 
word  fetich,  and  (2)  consider  the  reasons  for  and  against  this 
view. 

Account  of  the  word  given  in  Max  Muller's  Ilibbert 
Lectures,  p.  54.  Introduced  by  De  Bross,  1760.  Origin  of 
the  word  found  in  the  custom  of  Portuguese  navigators,  who 
called  the  inanimate  objects  worshipped  by  the  people  of 
West  Africa — feiticos. 


Word  used,  though  improperly,  with  great  latitude. 
Schultze  speaks  oi  mountains,  water,  etc.,  as  fetiches; 
Tiele,  of  Heaven  as  a  fetich.  Compte  gives  the  doctrine  of 
anuivi  mundi  as  illustration  of  fetich  worship.  And  so  an 
object  of  special  regard  is  termed  a  fetich  ;  a  child's  doll; 
a  lock  of  hair:  and  by  way  of  reproach,  a  theological  opin- 
ion: the  Protestant's  Bible:  the  Roman  Catholic  wafer. 
This  is  wrong.  The  word  is  properly  used  to  describe  the 
worship  ot  tangible,  inanimate  objects. 

So  regarding  it,  consider  the  reasons  for  calling  it  the 
earlic.-t  form  of  religion  : 

a.  It  is  the  lowest  form.  What  is  lowest  was  anterior. 
But  this  needs  proof. 

b.  Savage  and  uncivilized  races  are  types  of  primitive 
man.     But  this  assumes  there  has  been  no  degradation. 

c.  Empirical  philosophy  is  under  obligation  to  expound 
a  natural  history  of  religion.  But  this  necessity  is  only 
conditioned  by  the  exigencies  of  an  erroneous  philosophy. 

As  to  the  value  of  the  theory,  it  is,  however,  to  be  re- 
marked : 

1.  It  does  not  satisfy  one  of  the  leading  evolutionists,  Mr. 

Spencer. 

2.  It  is  difficult  to  determine,  from  the  evidence  furnished 

by  savage  tribes,  whether  the  Fetich  is  a  determina- 
tion of  a  general  belief  in  God,  or  whether  the  larger 
belief  in  God  is  developed  out  of  fetich-worship : 
whether  belief  in  God  is  the  logical  prius  of  the  fetich 
oi'  rii-r  versa. 

3.  And  though  the  people  of  W.  Africa  had  no  knowledge 

of  God  at  all,  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  this  con- 
dition is  not  due  to  a  degradation  from  a  primitive 
faith. 

4.  The  literature  of  India  proves  that  there  was  a  prim- 

itive Monotheism  or  Henotheism  lying  back  of  the 
Polytheism  of  a  later  day. 

5.  Spencer's  criticism   is   good.     Before  the  savage  can 

invest  this  or  that  stick  or  rag  with  life,  he  must 
have  a  general  animistic  conception.  Spencer  is 
trying  to  show  that  the  ghost- theory  is  the  true  the- 
ory and  that  belief  in  ghosts  antedates  belief  in  the 
fetich.  What  is  good  against  fetichism  in  favor  of 
ancestor  worship  is  good  also  against  fetichism  in 
favor  of  primitive  Theism. 


r 


C.  Herbert  Spencer. 

The  primitive  religion,  according  to  thi3  thinker,  was 
ancestor-worship.  Having  in  dreams  come  to  a  knowl- 
edge of  his  second  self,  that  is,  having  reached  the  belief  id 
the  soul,  the  step  was  easy  to  belief  in  the  continued  con- 
scious existence  of  the  departed.  Hence  ancestor- worship. 
And  Mr.  Spencer  is  at  great  pains  to  show  how  what  began 
as  worship  of  ancestors  in  time  took  on  the  form  of  wor- 
ship paid  to  plants,  animals,  the  heavenly  bodies  and  finally 
the  infinite  God. 

Genenral  Considerations. 

Spencer  has  faced  the  question  his  philosophy  required 
him  to  face,  that  of  accounting  for  religion  by  natural  causes. 
To  fail  here  would  be  the  destruction  of  his  system.  But  to 
show  that  the  origin  of  religion  may  be  as  he  describes  it, 
does  not  furnish  proof  that  such  is  its  origin.  The  theory 
of  religion  can  have  no  more  value  than  the  '  First  Princi- 
ples.' Again,  among  naturalistic  theories  of  religion  this 
must  be  considered  the  most  thorough-going:  for  while 
fetichism  leaves  unanswered  the  question  how  men  came  to 
worship  a  fetich,  the  theory  of  ancestor-worship  professes  at 
least  to  explain  how  belief  in  the  post  mortem  existence  of 
ancestors  came  to  be  entertained.  Omitting  all  reference  to 
criticisms  against  the  theory  and  against  the  philosophical 
system  of  which  it  is  part,  the  most  that  could  be  claimed 
for  it  would  be  that  it  presents  a  plausible  naturalistic  theory 
of  the  origin  of  religion,  as  opposed  to  the  supernaturalistic 
theory  of  Christianity. 

Special  Considerations. 

Spencer  has  failed,  however,  to  make  out  even  so  strong 
a  case  as  this. 

1.  To  prove  his  theory  he  should  have  shown  that  when 
homage  was  paid  to  ancestors,  no  homage  was  paid 
to  the  gods.  But  the  Vedahs  seem  to  illustrate  the 
contrary  idea  (Sociology  306). 

'2.  It  is  important  to  show  that  filial  piety  is  worship  or 
such  worship  as  is  paid  to  the  gods.  Spencer  talks 
very  loosely  in  regard  to  this.  n  0  * 


6 

s-  Because  the  savage  regards  God  as  his  father,  he  is  not 

therefore  worshipping  bis  ancestors.     To  make  much 

oi  the  case  of  [Jnkulunkulu  in  this  direction  would 

require  him  to  draw  a  similar  inference  from  our  use 

S^^i^u   (3  "J  I  rioi  tlu'  lord's  Prayer. 

4.  The  attempt  to  show  how  idolatry,  animal  worship  and 
nature  worship  were  related  to  ancestor-worship  is  an 
illustration  of  very  far-fetched  reasoning.  Thus:  fe- 
tich worship  from  identification  of  deceased  with 
portions  of  his  clothiug:  idol  worship  from  the  habit 
oi  making  images  of  the  deceased;  animal  worship 
Jrom  the  frequenting  of  the  home  of  the  deceased 
by  certain  animals,  or  from  the  fact  that  the  deceased 
ha<?  ;J"  animal  name:  plant-worship  from  the  intoxi- 
cating liquors  produced  from  some  plants,  supposed 
m  this  way  to  be  possessed  by  supernatural  beings; 
mountain  worship  and  worship  of  the  sea  from  the 
fad  that  their  ancestors  came  from  the  mountains  or 
over  the  sea— origin  in  this  sense  was  mistaken  for 
parentage. 

5.  The  most  plausible  argument  in  support  of  Spencer's 

view  would  be  derived  from  Greek  and  Roman  my- 
thology. Mr.  Spencer  is  thoroughly  committed  to 
the  Euhemeristic  theory  of  mythology;  but  he  has  to 
encounter  the  opposition  even  here  "of  a  very  influ- 
ential school  of  mycologists. 

6.  Mr.  Spencer  must  answer  more  fully  than  he  has  al- 

ready done,  the  allegation  that  ancester- worship  is 
confined  to  the  inferior  races  and  that  no  Indo- 
European  or  Semitic  nation,  so  far  as  we  know,  seems 
to  have  mad.-  a  lvligion  of  worship  of  the  dead  Mr 
Spencer  believes  that  the  "divine  man  as  conceived 
had  everywhere  for  antecedent  a  powerful  man  as 
Verceived  (Sociology,  438).  This  is  supported  by  say- 
ing tln.t  the  Jews  worshipped  an  ancestor  in  Jehovah  ; 
ami  this  simple  and  absurd  assertion  is  his  answer  to 
the  objection  thus  quoted. 

D.     IIeuel. 

There  is  nothing  that  calls  for  special  remark  so  far  as 
the  theistic  problem  in  the  Hegelian  philosophy  is  concern- 
ed,    lhe  development  of  Theism  is  a  part  of  a  system  of 


y     — 


I) 


development,  and  no  criticism  is  called  for  beyond  the  crit- 
icism of  the  system  itself,  which  is  obviously  out  of  place 
here.  Hegelianism  is  the  idealistic  form  of  the  doctrine 
of  development.  It  is  the  antipodes  of  the  philosophy  of 
Compte,  yet  presenting  points  of  resemblance  to  it.  In 
the  one  case  the  problem  is  :  Given  atoms,  to  make  a  cos- 
mos ;  and  the  solution  is  offered  us  in  the  First  Principles 
of  Herbert  Spencer.  In  the  other  case  the  problem  is: 
Given  the  Idea,  to  explain  the  cosmos;  and  for  answer  we 
are  told  of  a  process  of  successive  evolutions  ending  in  con- 
scious, thinking,  praying  man.  Monotheism  in  this  system, 
as  in  that  of  Compte  or  Spencer,  is  the  result  of  a  process 
which  has  been  going  on  silently  through  millenniums. 

E.     Max  Muller. 

It  is  not  very  easy  to  determine  the  position  of  this  author 
in  religious  thought.  His  didactic  position  does  not  quite 
accord  with  that  which  his  polemic  would  suggest. 

1.  In  his  attack  on  the  Comptean  theory  of  religion  he 

has  conclusively  shown  that  fetichism  is  not  the 
primitive  religion. 

2.  In   his  Hibbert  Lectures  he  avows  less  heartily  than 

in  an  earlier  work  his  belief  in  a  religious  instinct ; 
indeed  he  practically  discards  the  idea. 

3.  The  Max  Muller  of  to-day  is  not  the  Max  Muller  of 

Chips  from  a  German  Workshop,  (Transactions  of 
Victoria  Institute,  July,  1881),  and  cannot  be  quoted 
as  the  advocate  of  primitive  Monotheism  or  Ileno- 
theism.  For  while,  as  a  student  of  literature,  he 
tells  us  that  Vedic  Writings  show  that  belief  in  one 
God  (Henotheism)  antedated  Polytheism;  as  a  psy- 
chologist, asking  what  religion  a  man  can  learn 
through  his  five  senses,  he  tells  us  that  whether 
Monotheism  be  or  be  not  the  primitive  religion  is  of 
no  consequence,  since,  before  man  had  reached  any 
belief  in  God,  he  "  had  already  accomplished  half 
hie  journey."  The  primitive  Monotheism  pointed  to 
in  the  Vedas  is  thus  made  of  no  avail  by  the  sug- 
gestion that  the -journey  of  progress  was  half  done 
before  men  came  to  the  idea  of  God.  Max  Muller 
must  be  classed  among  the  evolutionists;  but  it  must 
be  noted  that  his  recent  conclusions  regarding  primi- 


tive  religions  are  in  conflict  with  the  testimony  of 
the  ancient  literature  of  India  which  he  has  brought 
to  the  attention  of  English  readers.  D1°ugnt 

-T  oCHPT  T  T1VTP 

Polytheism,  the  other  in  absolute  Monotheism  8 

-tiis  reasons  for  this  view  are : 

1.  It   furnishes   a   natural  answer   to  the  question   how 

men  became  Polytheists.    Belief  in  oneGod did noT 
exclude  belief  in  a  plurality  of  gods.  "0t 

2.  Monotheism  absolute,  or  belief  in   only  one  God    is 

said  to  be  a  generalization  derived  through  contact 

KSatos  ring  ^thei-  *&  *«& 

Second  Theory:     Revelation. 
1.  Distinguish    between   revelation    and   tradition       The 

ZT°U  '?  ',0t,h0VV  We  carae  t(>  believe    „  God   btt 
how  ,„,,,  belief  in  God  originated      tJL;    a',  ut 

s  offer  ?■*  a,idL»ce> a  SSlte! 

$  «   ],  r%  "ffn  °f  reh«,on  is  abs«rd.     The  o-e„esis 
beli^nofher  °"e  ^  a"d  the  P-P—tkH?!: 

2'  Swt£t^rmr°rreCtin°  a"d  theconserv- 

nthf^:fttKetfmregard  t0  Thei8m  and 

-Doubtless    our    nurp    Thm*™    ^     i 

inspired  Word,',"     JJ^  in^nfon'ly  ot 

•  ^Srt^iSn^  •""*  °f  I*-!.  the- 
lrenrsehwdthfcnfir8t  ^  °°d  "Sensible 

-ionsness,.      Cocker  ofes,  ^'~  £--*  -J 


yu^JJU* 


^^1&*Us^ 


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j^ilI^ 


*  uJUit-1*  JU~~^ 


^    ^U-d 


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nA<? 


V«-    ^i5<J     *     a^^^^r^i^^      ^*&aX 


J^vLoJ?  c^Kx^-^^^^ 


,      n~*~  ^       'k~*'     ^ 


(?/ai,    ^kJX  &**-&-  -^h-   <xsu«s*X  $MaL^~~ 


been  devoid  of  the  idea  of  God,  it  never  could  have  been 
taught  him.  (Christianity  and  Greek  Philosophy,  p.  95.) 
But  Cocker  does  not  distinguish  sufficiently  between  an  in- 
tuitive knowledge  of  God  and  a  priori  beliefs  that  lead  log- 
ically and  necessarily  to  the  theistic  inference.  Watson 
holds  that  the  successive  revelations  made  to  the  chosen 
people  were  disseminated  by  means  of  commercial  inter- 
course between  Jews  and  the  Gentile  world,  and  that  this 
accounts  for  the  similarities  of  belief  found  among  so  many 
nations. 

B.  Gladstone  accounts  for  these  similarities  by  supposing 
that  prior  to  the  dispersion  of  nations  there  was  a  revela- 
tion, comprehending  not  only  Monotheism,  but  even  the 
more  distinctive  doctrines  of  grace.  But  his  reasoning  is 
not  convincing. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  Theism  had  its  origin  in  Reve- 
lation, understanding  by  Revelation  what  the  writers  just 
referred  to  mean  by  it. 

Third  Theory  :    Inference. 

It  is  held  by  some,  in  opposition  to  the  doctrine  that  be- 
lief in  God  is  intuitional,  that  men  reach  Theism  through 
inference.  Thus  Dr.  McCosh  argues  forcibly  (Intuitions, 
377)  that  Theism  does  not  possess  the  character  of  a  simple, 
original,  unresolvable  belief;  and  Dr.  Flint  affirms  that 
belief  in  God  is  an  inference,  though,  as  he  admits,  an  uncon- 
scious inference.  He  illustrates  and  maintains  his  position 
with  great  aptness  and  force.     But  it  is  to  be  remarked  : 

1.  We  must  distinguish  between  the  vindication  of  a  be- 

lief and  its  genesis.  Because  we  can  give  reasons 
for  believing  in  God,  it  does  not  follow  that  we  be- 
lieve in  God  on  account  of  reasons. 

2.  Yet  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  a  belief  that  can  be  de- 

fended by  reasons  may  be  reached  through  reasons; 
and  it  is  true  that  there  are  cases  where  men  have 
left  Polytheism  for  Theism  through  force  of  reason- 
ing. 

3.  There  is  force  in   the   frequent  remark  that  men  be- 

lieved God  before  they  reasoned  about  him  ;  and  this 
force,  though  diminished,  is  not  destroyed  by  Dr. 
Flint's  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  unconscious  in- 
ference. 


10 

Fourth  Theory  :    Intuition. 

The  word  Intuition  here  is  used  in  a  broad  sense,  and 
opinions  that  differ  widely,  and  arc  in  some  cases  in  open 
conti  ct,  will  be  grouped  under  this  head.  Different  from 
one  and  other  as  thev  may  be,  they  are  at  one  in  the  state- 
ment that  belief  in  God  does  not  owe  its  genesis  either  to 
objective  revelation  or  to  a  conscious  inference. 

(1.)  Schelling  and  Cousin. — Both,  though  in  different 
forms,  believed  that  we  have  an  immediate  knowledge  of 
God,  the  Absolute. 

See  on  this  Dr.  Hodge's  chapter,  "  Can  God  be  known  ?  " 
and  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton's  "  Discussions." 

(2.)  Jacobi  and  Schleiermacher. — To  have  attention 
turned  to  the  feelings,  as  an  offset  to  the  purely  ethical  sys- 
tems in  vogue,  was  of  great  advantage:  yet  it  was  a  mis- 
take to  call  the  sense  of  dependence,  God  consciousness. 
Mansel  makes  this  mistake.  (Limits  of  Religious  Thought, 
p.  115.) 

(3.)  Calderwood. — This  writer  says  that  belief  in  the  ex- 
istence of  one  infinite  God  is  a  necessary  belief.  In  sup- 
porting this  he  affirms  the  inconclusiveness  of  all  arguments 
for  the  Divine  existence — an  unnecessary  and  unfortunate 
mode  of  argument,  since  it  stakes  the  validity  of  theistic 
belief  on  the  question  of  its  intuitive  character. 

(4.)  Hodge. — Dr.  Hodge  says  that  the  idea  of  God  is  in- 
nate. Yet  notice:  {a)  He  maintains  the  validity  of  theistic 
proof,  (b)  He  does  not  believe  that  we  have  an  innate  idea 
of  the  one  living  and  true  God.  (c)  He  means  that  men  had 
an  idea  of  God  before  any  act  of  conscious  inference.  His 
position  does  not  differ  materially  from  Dr.  Flint's. 

(").)  Caird.  Though  arguing  against  the  intuitive  view 
in  its  strict  sense,  Caird  must  be  included  under  this  head 
when  the  word  is  used  in  the  broad  sense  of  this  discussion. 
lie  holds  that  it  is  ;t  necessary  for  the  mind  to  relate  itself  to 
God."  Belief  in  God  is  not  an  inference  taken  into  the 
soul  through  force  of  reasons.  It  is  a  belief,  rather,  that 
flows  by  the  influence  of  the  Divine  impulse  into  the  chan- 
nel of  the  soul's  activities 

These  different  opinions  represent  several  senses  in  which 
the  word  intuition  is  used  in  theistic  discussions. 

1.  By  intuition  we  may  mean  an  immediate  knowledge 
of  God.  Claims  to  this  kind  of  knowledge  have 
been  sufficiently  refuted  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton. 


^—    5 


^J|«J  <L*~U   <j    ^7 


^ 


11 

2.  By  intuition  may  be  meant  an  intuitive,  self-evident, 

and  necessary  judgment  or  belief.  That  belief  in 
God  is  not  of  this  kind,  Dr.  McCosh  and  Dr.  Flint 
have  shown. 

3.  Most  men   who  say  that  their  belief  in   God   is  intui- 

tive mean  only  that  we  have  a  constitutional  ten- 
dency or  impulse  toward  belief  in  God.  This,  how- 
ever, is  capable  of  being  represented  in  different 
ways.  What  is  the  explanation  of  this  impulse,  or 
instinct,  or  tendency  ? 

(a)  It  may  mean  no  more  than  the  rapid,  and  so  uncon- 
scious inference,  such  as  is  involved  in  the  recogni- 
tion of  our  fellow  men.  That  is  Dr.  Flint's,  and 
substantially  Dr.  Hodge's  view. 

(6)  The  idea  of  God  may  be  the  necessary  correlative  of 
the  idea  of  the  finite,  the  conditioned. — Cousin. 

(c)  With  some  the  idea  of  God  is  a  moment  in  a  process 

wherein  God  himself  is  coming  to  consciousness. 
Man's  thought  of  God  is  therefore  God's  thought  of 
himself. — Hegel. — Caird. 

(d)  Again,  the  idea  of  God  may  be  God's  testimony  to  His 

own  existence.  Is  there  any  objection  to  this  view 
of  the  genesis  of  an  idea  of  God  ?  We  live  and  move 
and  have  our  being  in  Him.  Are  there  not  good 
reasons  for  believing  that  it  is  through  the  Spirit  of 
God  within,  and  not  merely  by  arguments  without, 
that  we  derive  our  first  belief  in  God  ? 

This  view  would  have  these  advantages,  at  least : 

a.  Objective  theistic  proof  is  not  made  unnecessary  by 
this  explanation. 

/?.  The  theistic  belief,  not  originating  in  induction,  is  not 
conditioned  by  the  probability  of  inductive  proof. 

f.  This  view  accounts  for  all  forms  of  the  <t  priori  argu- 
ment, and  justifies,  in  a  measure,  the  claims  that  are 
made  on  behalf  of  intuitional  Theism. 

d.  It  falls  in  with  the  analogy  of  subsequent  Revelation. 

e.  It  makes  it  unnecessary  to  establish  a  schism  between 

Adam  and  his  posterity,  as  to  the  mode  of  knowing 
God. 
£.  It  is  in  harmony  with  the  doctrine  of  God's  omnipres- 
ence to  believe  that  His  thought  is  so  tar  confluent 
with  ours,  that  we  know  him  through  His  direct 
relation  to  the  soul. 


12 

III.    Discussion  of  Theism. 

Three  divisions  : 

1.  The  ancient  period,  extending  to  the  8th  century  A.  D; 

Greek  and  Roman  philosophy. 

2.  The  mediaeval,  extending  to  the  15th  century.     Scho- 

lasticism. 

3.  The  modern. 

I.      FIRST    PERIOD. 

Greek  philosophy  falls  into  three  divisions :  The  Pre- 
Socratic;  the  Socratic-Aristotelian ;  the  Post- Aristotelian. 

The  Pre-Socratic  period  exhibits  a  developing  process  of 
generalization.  There  is  little  Theism  in  it ;  but  it  is  less 
Pantheistic,  probably,  than  is  commonly  supposed. 

Assuming  that  the  generalizing  process  took  on  two 
forms  in  the  Ionic  School,  the  mechanical  and  the  dynamic, 
Anaximander  illustrates  the  latter.  Under  the  idea  of  to 
dTrecpou,  he  construed  the  universe  in  a  pantheistic,  or  as 
Fortlage  puts  it,  a  cosmotheistic  sense. 

In  the  Eleatic  School,  the  leading  idea  was  the  One  to  ev. 
As  in  the  Ionic  School,  the  effort  of  the  Eleatics  was  to 
reach  unity,  but  in  a  different  way.  Anaximander  con- 
ceived of  the  multiplicity  in  the  phenomenal  world  as  modes 
of  existing  matter :  he  was  cosmotheistic.  Parmenides,  on 
the  other  hand,  reached  unity  by  a  process  of  abstraction, 
by  stripping  objects  of  their  predicates.  His  unity  was  a 
logical  unity — the  highest  category,  or  Being.  His  sys- 
tem was  a  Logo-theism.  Xenophanes  is  the  theist  of  the 
Eleatics.  He  protests  against  Polytheism,  and  ridicules 
Anthropomorphism.  His  Monotheism  has  been  called  Pan- 
theism, but,  probably,  on  insufficient  ground. 

The  Eleatics  give  us  the  earliest  form  of  the  ontological 
argument ;  and  they  open  the  important  discussion  of  the 
relation  of  the  One  to  the  many.  That  relation  may  be 
represented  as  that  of 

(a)  Genus  and  Species :  Logo-theism. 

(6)   Substance  and  mode  :  Cosmo-theism. 

(c)  Cause  and  effect :  Theism. 

In  the  second  period  of  Greek  philosophy  we  find  Anax- 
agoras,  who  marks  an  advance  in  theistic  discussion. 

Anaxagoras  recognized  not  only  the  unity  of  the  world, 
but  also  its  order  and  adjustments;  and  tbese  he  accounted 


13 

for  by  affirming  the  existence  of  a  world-ordering  vou?.  He 
is  distinctly  complimented  by  Aristotle  for  this  "advance  in 
the  explanation  of  the  universe.  There  is  no  lc« »o«1  reason 
for  denying  to  Anaxagoraa  the  distinction  of  being  the 
father  of  the  doctrine  of  Final  Causes;  and  the  fact  that,  for 
the  most  part,  he  explains  phenomena  in  a  mechanical  way, 
does  not  disprove  the  fact  that,  arguing  from  the  analogy  of 
his  own  intelligence,  he  referred  the  order  of  the  universe 
also  to  Intelligence. 

The  Eleatic  and  the  Anaxagorean  doctrim'  differed  thus: 
The  Eleatic  affirmed  the  existence  of  one,  necessary  Being, 
the  ground  of  all  phenomena;  Anaxagoras  conceived  of  the 
world,  not  as  an  existence  merely,  but  as  such  an  existence, 
and  suggested  a  vobz  as  its  explanation.  The  Eleatic  saw 
the  world  of  multitude  and  sought  the  unifying  principle: 
the  Anaxagorean  saw  the  world  of  adaptation  and  sought 
the  organising  principle. 

Socrates  discussed  Theism  for  practical  ends;  and  he  was 
the  first  among  the  Greeks,  says  Oesterley,  to  do  so.  Hie 
was  not  the  Theism  of  speculation,  but  the  practical  Theism, 
that  had  good  morals  as  its  motive.  His  statement  of  the 
teleological  argument  is  to  be  found  in  the  Memorabilia, 
JBk.  I.,  Cap.  4,  and  is  familiar. 

Plato  has  been  charged  with  Pantheism  ;  and  his  confused 
sense  respecting  Personality,  his  interchangeable  use  of  the 
words  God  and  Good,  and  his  want  of  nice  discrimination 
between  the  First  and  the  Final  Cause,  constitute  the  basis 
of  this  charge,  which  Prof.  Jowctt  says  is  untrue.  The 
Theism  of  Plato  embraces  the  following  points: 

1.  But  for  prevalent  Atheism,  there  would  be  no  need  of 

proving  God's  existence. 

2.  The  soul  has  a  natural  tendency  to  believe  in  God. 

3.  The  orderly  movements  of  the   heavenly  bodies  sug- 

gested to  him  a  Divine  author  and  presence. 
The  distinction  now  made  between   order  and   ends  in 
nature  was  understood.     This  argument    (the   Cos- 
mological)  is  found  in  the  tenth  hook  of  the  Laws. 

4.  But  in  the  Timaeua  he  argues  teleological ly,  from  the 

adaptation  of  means  to  cuds  in  our  bodily  organism. 
6.  The  serological  argument,  pure  and  simple,  was  also 
recognized;  though  it  is  the  distinction  of  Aristotle 
to  have  developed  it. 


14 

6.  The  incommensurable  character  of  mind  and  matter 
leads  to  the  argument  for  a  universal  mind.  His 
view  approaches  the  doctrine  of  the  anima  mundi,and 
this  may  be  the  basis  of  the  allegation  that  he  was  a 

pantheist.      But   the   doctrine  of  the  anima   tumuli  is 
not   Pantheism. 

Aristotle  found  arguments  for  the  existence  of  God  in 
the  religious  consciousness  of  men,  and  in  the  order  of  the 
world.  His  great  argument,  however,  and  the  one  most 
characteristic  oi'  his  philosophy,  is  found  in  his  doctrine  of 
a  First  Mover.  There  is,  he  says,  first  that  which  is  moved 
but  does  not  produce  motion;  secondly,  that  which  both 
moves  and  causes  motion  :  and,  thirdly,  that  which  is  un- 
moved and  produces  motion.  The  first  mover  is  incorpo- 
real, immovable,  without  parts  or  passions.  It  is  pure 
energy;  Absolute  Being:  God.  God  has  no  end  outside 
of  Himself.  He  is  his  own  end.  God's  thought  does  not 
find  its  object  out  of  Himself.  Thought  and1  thinker  are 
one.     His  thought  is  the  thought  of  thought. 

Aristotle  has  given  us,  says  Zeller,  the  first  scientific 
foundation  for  Theism,  inasmuch  as  in  his  system  the  defi- 
nite thought  of  a  self-conscious  intelligence  in  God  is  not 
clue  to  a  merely  religious  idea,  but  is  rigidly  deduced  from 
the  principles  of  his  philosophical  system. 

Yet,  as  Zeller  goes  on  to  shew,  it  is  difficult  to  say  what 
Aristotle  held,  regarding  the  relation  of  God  to  the  world; 
and  this  difficulty  has  led  some  to  say  that  his  Theism 
was,  in  reality,  a  Pantheism,  that  is  to  say,  was  not  The- 
ism at  all. 

iSTo  one  has  recognized  finality  in  nature  more  distinctly 
than  Aristotle.  He  was  as  cognizant  as  Paley  of  the  adap- 
tation of  means  to  ends.  But  finality  in  nature  does  not 
seem  to  shut  him  up  to  the  necessity  of  conceiving  God  as 
a  designer.  Nature,  he  says,  has  a  tendency  to  realize  the 
good.  God,  says  Aristotle,  moves  the  world  as  the  loved 
object  moves  the  one  loving.  And  this,  by  some,  is  con- 
strued to  mean  that  God  is  the  efficient  cause,  only  as  He  is 
the  final  cause.  This,  again,  is  capable  of  being  understood 
in  a  sense  that  destroys  the  distinction  between  God  and  the 
world  ;  that  is  to  say,  is  a  purely  pantheistic  sense.  Is  God 
only  another  name  for  the  order,  the  finality,  manifest  in 
the  world  ?     If  so,  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  is  pantheistic. 


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15 

Or  does  the  order  and  finality  exhibited  in  Nature  exist  as  a 
prius  in  the  thought  of  God  ?  This  would  be  theistic,  and 
this  seems  to  be  Aristotle's  idea,  for  he  Bays  "  the  world  lias 
its  principle  in  God,  and  this  principle  exists,  not  merely  as 

a  form  immanent  in  the  world,  like  the  order  in  an  array, 
but  also  a  self-existent  Bubstance,  like  the  general  in  an 
army."  (Ueberweg,  I,  163.)  See,  also,  Sir  Alex.  Grant's 
Ethics  oi'  Aristotle.  Vol.  I,  283. 

The  Epicureans  found  their  proof  of  God's  existence  in 
the  universality  of  the  belief  This  was  not  the  argument 
e  consensu  gentium.,  nor  was  it,  as  Cicero  Biipposed,  the 
doctrine  that  belief  in  God  is  innate.  The  7Cp6Xy<fie<:  of  the 
Epicureans  was  held  to  prove  God's  existence,  by  showing 
that  the  gods  universally  manifested  themselves  to  men  by 
direct  contact  in  sleep.  The  Stoics,  with  their  doctrine  of 
the  anima  mwndi,  are  frequently  quoted  as  pantheists.  Y.  i 
notice  that  they  believed  in  the  separate  personality  and 
immortality  of  the  individual  soul,  as  well  as  in  an  intelli- 
gent, world-ordering  soul  of  the  world. 

The  conflicting  sentiments  of  the  Stoics,  Epicureans,  and 
philosophers  of  the  New  Academy,  were  brought  out  in 
Cicero's  De  Natwra  Deorum,  the  one  work  on  Natural  The- 
ology that  antiquity  has  furnished  us.  After  the  time  of 
Cicero,  Greek  philosophy  was  affected  by  Oriental  influ- 
ences; but  though  it  became  more  Theosophical,  no  con- 
tribution to  theistic  discussion  seems  to  have  been  made. 
Among  the  church  fathers,  Clement  and  Origen  denied 
the  possibility  of  proving  the  existence  of  God,  and  placed 
this  belief  among  the  <i  priori  elements  of  knowledge.  Ath- 
anasius  recognized  the  moral  argument  as  the  strongest. 
Augustine  argues  from  the  relatively  good,  great,  and  true 
to  the  absolutely  and  infinitely  good,  great,  and  true.  11  • 
discussion  of  the  highest  truth  enters  hugely  into  the  dis« 
cussions  of  a  later  day.  Boethius,  (474  A.  D.),  in  hie  D 
Consolatiorn  Philosophiae,  enlarged  upon  tin-  same  idea.  He 
was  the  precursor  of  Anselm  in  this  field,  and  is  said  by 
Kostlin  (Stud.  u.  Krit,  1875)  to  be  the  founder  of  ontologicaJ 
theistic  proof. 

'2.       SECOND    PERIOD. 

The  conditions  did  not  exist  in  the  ancienl  world  for  the 
production  of  a  reasoned  Theism  and  of  elaborate  treatises 
in  Natural  Theology.     These  conditions  are, 


</ 


16 
1. 


Tll?;Tiitl.,fSi?  betTe'?  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion 
the  result  of  our  having  the  Bible  ^ugion, 

tuo'viXTof  ?TaHC  Th00l°^-     For  *»>«>  o- 

,^^^^,^25-.  &  ^tion 

3.  The  polem.c  relations  of  Theism  to  anti-Stic  theo- 

^l^o^ll^T^aX^  m°tion'  the 

speeiaH  ^tfT'lS  °°Zt £?  Jom,  Scl->astieism,  devoted 

basfs  of  the  highest  Truth  and  tht 1  T"  haJ  a''gUed  °"  the 
relative  and  the  imperfect  so  AnlT?  °^h-°  basis  of  the 
t^Monologium  pro^d  Z^bl2TL^l£ 

fl^pfiffiL*1?  maieMa°cno0ltr '/D8elm  *«™^  «- 
existence  of  God.  The  kev  to  ^  demonst}"^n  of  the 
phrase  which  he  uses  in th hi he  "^ument  ls  f°™<l  in  a 

the  treatise  begins  Th0u  art  ha  "'  ^  W-ith  which 
possil.  °  U  ait  that  1U0  mhil  majus  cogilari 

1.  Anselm's  statement  and  Gaunilo's  renlv 

beYoL'etd6  *$£$£$£?**.  f^ t«-  cannot 
that  which  exists  t  SeL iu  rtT'f  W  "J"  «reater  tha» 
we  believe  in  a  beta,  th* „  wh Therefore  whe»  we  say  that 
ceived,  we  mill  '  *■  ^eater  cannot  b*  con- 

did  not  exist  "f ,-  ,  "J  Luld  thmkXof 'h?  *  ~     F°r  if  God 

cannot  be  thought  S  toT  £  ««*    ^ 


^  la  u  u~*  &  gu^*~<.  i&4fr 


17 

think  can  be  thought  not  to  be,  we  can  think  of  a  Being 
who  cannot  be  thought  not  to  be,  and  this  would  be  greater. 
But  we  are  thinking  of  a  Being  than  whom  a  greater  can- 
not be  conceived.  Gaunilo  replies  by  saying,  substantially, 
that  what  exists  subjectively  does  not  necessarily  exist  objec- 
tively. Between  the  greatest  Being  thought  as  existing  and 
the  greatest  Being  actually  existing,  there  is  a  wide  difference. 
Then  follows  his'farnous  illustration  of  the  island.    ' 

Anselm  replies  by  saying  that  his  argument  is  unique ; 
that  it  applies  only  to  the  Being,  quo  majus  non  cogitari '  possit  ; 
that  if  Gaunilo  could  find  anything  to  which  his  reasoning 
would  apply  except  this  being  quo  majus,  etc.,  he  would 
make  him  a  present  of  the  lost  island. 

2.  Criticisms  of  the  Anselmian  proof.  SeeRunze:  Der 
Ontologische  Gottesbeweis.  n     v         yj 

(a)  Assumptions.      Fortlage,  Hasse,  and    others    say    the  UK^T^'i^     J 
whole  discussion  depends  on  the  RMism.  that  underlies  it.  StiX»-^ 
Others    say  that   Anselm  first  gets  his  idea  of  God  from 
Revelation,  and  then  seeks  to  legitimate  it  by  reasoning. 

Then  again  it  is  said  that  his  argument  is  an  attempt  to  give 
dialectical  certitude  to  an  idea  derived  through  the  witness    x_ 
of  the  Holy  Ghost. 

(b)  The  aim  of  the  Anselmian  proof  has  been  criticised. 
Schelling  says  that  Anselm  tried  to  prove  God's  existence  as 
if  God  were  an  individual  to  be  coordinated  with  other 
individuals,  whereas  He  is  the  ground  of  all  Being.  But 
Anselm  is  not  open  to  the  charge  of  holding  a  merely  me- 
chanical Theism. 

As  little  force  is  there  in   the  objection  that  we  cannot   £^u^ 
prove  God's  existence  a  priori  and  deductively,  because  God,   ^   s  ' 
being  the  summum  genus,  cannot  be   included  in  a  higher 
genus. 

(c)  Objections  based  on  the  method  of  Anselm.  It  was 
a  mistake  to  seek  to  prove  God's  existence  by  syllogistic 
process.  God,  says  Fischer,  is  metalogical.  Great  unan- 
imity of  thinkers  on  this  point.  In  tact,  however  sure  we 
are  of  God's  existence,  when  we  try  to  prove  it,  we  only 
transfer,  it  is  said,  the  assumption  from  the  conclusion  to 
the  premises. 

But  there  is  no  corresponding  unanimity  in  regard  to  the^ 
particular  fallacy  in  the  reasoning  of  Anselm.  Identity  of 
premises,  circle,  petitio  principii,  four  terms,  not  to  speak  of 
other  fallacies,  have  all  been  laid  to  his  charge. 


18 

(d)  Vilmar  denounces  the  Anselmian  proof  in  the  inter- 
ests of  revealed  truth,  as  the  "  most  glaring  illusions  of  a 
most  vicious  pride.0  This,  if  valid  against  Anselm,  is  valid 
against  all  reasoned  Theism. 

3    Remarks  on  the  Anselmian  proof. 

Anselm  may  be  considered  as  reasoning  from  any  of  these 
premises : 

(a)  What   exists  in  intelleciu  exists  in  re.     A  Being    quo 

//Kfjus,  etc. 
This  would  justify  Gaunilo's  objection.     But  this  is  not 
Anselm. 

(b)  What  is  necessarily  in  intelleciu  exists  in  re.      A  Being 

quo  majus,  etc. 
Tfcis  would  make  superfluous  the  statement  that  to  exist 
in  re  is  greater  than  to  exist  in  intelleciu.     Again,  this  is  not 
Anselm. 

(c)  What  is  necessarily  thought  to  exist  in  re,  does  exist 

in  re.  But  a  Being  quo  majus,  etc.  Therefore,  etc. 
This  is  the  Anselmian  position;  and  the  minor 
premise  clearly  needs  proof.  Anselm  tries  to  prove 
it.  His  argument  is  the  one  attempt  in  history  to 
give  dialectical  objectivity  to  an  idea  of  the  Infinite. 
Hence  the  attention  it  has  attracted.  The  nerve  of  the 
argument  is  in  the  statement,  "  What  exists  in  re  is 
greater  than  what  exists  in  intelleciu;"  and  since  we 
are  necessarily  led  to  think  of  a  Being  than  which  a 
greater  cannot  be  conceived,  we  are  "supposed  to  be 
necessarily  led  to  think  of  such  a  Being  as  existing 
in  re. 

To  which  it  may  be  replied  : 

1.  That  the  predicate  existence  adds  nothing  to  the  con- 
cept; and  so  it  may  be  denied  that  a  thing  in  re  is 
greater  than  a  thing  in  intelleciu. 

1.  That  if  a  thing  in  re  were  greater,  then  the  conclusion 
Mould  be  either  that  a  Being  in  re  existed  in  intelleciu, 
which  is  absurd;  or  that  the  Being  in  intelleciu  was 
not  a  Being  quo  majus,  etc. ;  since  it  was  not  as  great 
as  the  Being  in  re. 

Aquinas  devotes  two  pages  in  his  Summa  [qaaestio  2)  to 
the  existence  of  God  and  adduces  five  arguments: 

1.  From  motion.  It  is  Aristotle's  argument  for  a  first 
mover,  and  really  means  that  a  first  cause  which  is 
not  a  physical  cause,  is  the  only  true  cause. 


'WSU--CJL>L'4~' 


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19 

2.  The  argument  based  on  the  efficient  cause — an  implicit 

statement  of  the  aetiological  argument. 

3.  The  argument  ex  possibili  et  necessario.     There  must  be 

some  necessary  Being,  having  its  cause  of  existence 
in  itself,  and  therefore  eternal. 

4.  The    argument    ex  gradibus   qui    in   rebus   inveniuntur. 

Virtually,  Augustine's  argument  as  to  the  highest 
truth. 

5.  The  argument  ex  gubernatione  rerum  :   a  compact  state- 

ment of  the  teleological  argument.  , — -» 

The  last  of  the   Schoolmen  who  deserve  notice  here  is  J^^A    ^^^f 
Raymond    de  Sebonde,  (1334  A.D.,  about),  whose  epoch-        ^^Jx   * 
making  book  was  the  first  systematic  treatise  on  Natural  #>  y<^^,    ^ 


Theology.  Raymond's  book  is  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  ^* 
prove  from  nature  the  doctrines  of  revealed  religion.  He  o-v.  Ir-^1  <u*jt'~ 
affirms  that  God  has  given  us  two  revelations:  creatura  and  <2^trA  fu^^1 
Scriptura.     His   hook  is  entitled  Liber   Oreaturarum.     Best  ,       a    ,,  M 

account  of  his  system  given  by  Ms^e./^uU^-*-  .     I  ^, 


THIRD    PERIOD. 


■y^  ^W^ 


The  publication  of  Descartes'  discourse  on  Method,  in 
1639,  marks  the  transition  to  the  modern  period  in  theistic 
discussion.  Of  his  Theism  there  should  be  no  doubt,  for 
he  says  :  "  By  the  name  of  God  I  mean  an  infinite,  eternal, 
immutable,  independent,  omniscient,  omnipotent  substance 
by  which  I  and  all  other  things  which  are,  if  it  be  true  that 
these  things  exist,  have  been  created.*'  Dr.  Runze,  in  his 
recent  history  of  the  ontological  proofs,  complains  that 
his  Theism  is  too  Deistic,  in  this  respect  contrasting  with 
Ansehu.  Saisset,  on  the  other  hand,  in  his  Modern  Pan- 
theism, begins  with  Descartes.  His  criticisms  are  acute. 
But  Descartes'  doctrine  of  continuous  creation,  together 
with  his  determinism,  do  not  suffice  to  prove  the  charge  of 
Pantheism.  Mahaffy  also  gives  probably  too  much  weight 
to  a  casual  remark  of  Descartes,  that  "'the  Deity  might  be 
identified  with  the  order  of  Nature." 

Before  noticing  the  Cartesian  argument,  consider  this 
remarkable  statement :  "I  very  clearly  see  that  tie-  certitude 
and  truth  of  all  science  depends  on  the  knowledge  alone  of 
the  true  God,  insomuch  that  before  I  knew  Him,  1  could 
have  no  perfect  knowledge  of  any  other  thing.''  His  argu-^ 
ment  is,  that  unless  I  know  God  I  know  nothing:    since,  if 


20 

there  be  no  God,  how  do  1  know  that  my  senses  do  not 
deceive  me.  This  is  substantially  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  argu- 
ment for  the  veracity  of  consciousness.  But  is  this  not 
reasoning  in  a  circle?  If  I  must  know  God  before  I  can 
know  anything,  how  can  I  ever  know  God  ?  Confidence  in 
our  knowing  powers  must  condition  confidence  in  our 
knowledge  of  God. 

Descartes  did  not  fall  into  such  a  palpable  fallacy.  Rightly 
or  wrongly,  Descartes  was  as  sure  of  God's  existence  as  of 
the  truths  of  geometry.  But  it  is  conceivable,  he  says,  that 
he  is  imposed  upon  in  the  very  constitution  of  his  nature. 
That  is,  he  sees  that  the  reasonings  in  geometry  are  true,  on 
the  supposition  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  truth,  and  that 
this  postulate  conditions  them.  Is  not  this  Cartesian  posi- 
tion our  own  position  in  the  debate  of  to-day  ?  The  theistic 
hypothesis  is  the  only  guarantee,  in  other  words,  of  our 
intellectual  integrity.  We  can  cast  discredit  upon  all  pro- 
cesses of  thinking,  by  a  theory  of  knowledge  that  destroys 
the  possibility  of  knowledge;  or  we  can  make  belief  in  God 
the  presupposition  and  postulate  of  all  knowledge.  This  is 
not  reasoning  in  a  circle. 

Descartes  made  use  of  three  arguments  for  the  existence 
of  God. 

1.  From  the  idea  of  a  Perfect  Being.  He  sought  to  show 
that  existence  was  implied  in  the  idea  of  a  Perfect  Being. 
lt  I  found  that  the  existence  of  the  Being  was  comprised  in 
the  idea,  in  the  same  way  that  the  equality  of  its  three 
angles  to  two  right  angles  is  comprised  in  the  idea  of  a  tri- 
angle."" This  argument  is  not  as  acute  as  Anselm's,  and  is 
equally  open  to  criticism. 

2.  From  the  causal  judgment  in  accounting  for  his  own 
existence.     This  is  exhibited  under  several  forms. 

(a)  My  continued  existence  from  moment  to  moment 
requires  a  cause  as  much  as  my  beginning  to  exist. 

(6)  The  cause  of  my  beginning  to  exist  is  either  self-exist- 
ent, or  is  also  a  caused  existence,  and  so  back  in  the 
regress  of  causes  till  we  come  to  a  first  cause. 

(c)  But,  really,  my  parents  are  not  the  cause  of  my  exist- 
ence :  i.  e.,  of  my  mind.  "  It  does  not  follow  that  I 
am  conserved  by  them,  or  even  that  I  was  produced 
by  them,  in  so  far  as  I  am  a  thinking  being."  Crea- 
tionism,  in  other  words,  is,  according  to  Descartes, 
the  only  rational  explanation  of  the  origin  of  the  soul. 


U^      /  aJJ        rf^vt/-^*  •<  7-C-        ^    ~~~^ 
-  ,  h       k~  ,         t&t      ^        <**>   ^ 

}yW—j(l        G^r-^^X~-t^*^-~        ^-^^        A"-+~^.        -<J^cr^ 


21 

3.  From  the  causal  judgment,  as  accounting  for  the  idea 
of  God  in  man.  It  was  impossible,  he  said,  that  the  idea  of 
a  Perfect  Being  should  originate  with  himself,  an  imperfect 
heing;  and  t4  it  but  remained  that  it  had  been  placed  in  me 
by  a  nature  which  was,  in  reality,  more  perfect  than  mine, 
and  which  possessed  within  itself  all  the  perfections  of  which 
I  could  form  any  idea  :  that  is  to  say,  in  a  single  word, 
which  was  God."     (Method  77.) 

With  the  exception  of  the  first,  which  is  the  ontological, 
or  Anselmian  argument,  the  Cartesian  proofs  are  <i  posteri- 
ori, the  second  being  the  application  of  the  causal  judgment 
to  the  author's  own  contingent  existence;  and  the  third, 
which  contains  the  distinctive  feature  of  Cartesian  Theism, 
affirms  that  the  existence  of  God  will  alone  explain  belief  in 
God. 

Kuno  Fischer  (I.,  307)  represents  the  Cartesian  proofs  as 
proceeding  according  to  the  following  stages:  (1)  The  idea 
of  a  Perfect  Being;  this  is  not  significant  unless  necessary  : 
(2)  the  idea  necessary;  even  this  no  guarantee  of  objective 
reality:  (3)  the  idea  the  product  of  the  Perfect  Being,  for 
tli c*  imperfect  being  could  not  have  originated  it.  There  is, 
therefore,  a  God,  for  the  idea  of  God  is  the  revelation  of 
Himself. 

The  ontological  and  the  "  anthropological  "  proof,  as 
Fischer  calls  it,  go  hand  in  hand.  The  union  of  the  two 
makes  the  difference  between  the  Anselmian  and  the  Car- 
tesian proof.  There  is,  doubtless,  great  force  in  this  com- 
bination ;  but,  as  Kostlin  says,  the  combination  is  Fischer's 
not  Descartes'.  Note,  also,  that  Descartes  held  that  the  belief 
in  God  is  an  '  innate  idea,'  notwithstanding  his  statement 
that  it  is  an  effect,  the  cause  of  which  is  God.  Compare 
tins  with  what  is  said  above  on  the  genesis  of  the  idea  ot 
God  :  Intuition. 

Pantheist  as  he  is,  Spinoza  is  usually  cited  by  the  histo- 
rians of  Theism.  Indeed,  Schwegler  regards  bis  doctrine  as 
the  4t  most  abstract  Theism."  This  is  wrong.  Spinoza  will 
be  discussed  later,  under  Antitheism.  Notice  tin'  common 
ground  between  Theism  and  Pantheism,  as  illustrated  in 
Spinoza's  proof  of  God's  existence.  Both  use  arguments 
based  on  cause:  both,  the  principle  ex  nihilo,  etc.  Both 
affirm  the  necessity  of  a  ground  of  all  being.  To  both  the 
contingency  of  the  phenomenal  and  the  individual  are  ap- 
parent.    The  difference,  primarily,  respects  the  relation  of 


22 

the  One  and  the  Many ;  and,  secondarily,  the  predicates 
which  are  to  be  affixed  to  the  One  (See  below,  Samuel 
Clarke).  Malebranche  should  be  mentioned  here,  with  the 
query  whether  he  should  be  regarded  as  a  theist  or  panthe- 
ist. Bowen  stands  by  him  as  not  being  a  pantheist.  (Mod. 
Philosophy,  84). 

Leibnitz,  with  his  doctrine  of  monads  and  of  pre  estab- 
lished harmony,  was  led  naturally  to  consider  the  theolog- 
ical facts  of  the  world.  Finality  is  necessarily  part  of  his 
-y^tem.  Only  two  views  were  possible.  His  thought  might 
terminate  in  the  order,  calling  it  God  ;  or  he  might  seek  a 
cause  of  this  order,  and  so  be  a  theist :  and  a  theist  we 
believe  him  to  have  been.  The  Cartesian  proof  was  char- 
acterized as  an  "  imperfect  demonstration,"  and  Leibnitz 
said  that  Descartes  ought  first  to  have  proved  the  possibility 
of  God's  existence,  lie  was  the  originator  of  the  once  com- 
mon method  of  arguing  the  fact  of  God's  existence  from  the 
possibility  of  His  existence. 

Locke  is  the  author  of  atheistic  argument,  based  on  the 
existence  of  the  human  mind,  which  "  Physicus  "  makes  the 
subject  of  elaborate  criticism.  Briefly  stated  it  is  :  (a)  Since 
something  is,  something  must  always  have  been  ;  (0)  And 
there  has  been  a  knowing  being  from  all  eternity,  or  else 
there  was  a  time  when  there  was  no  knowledge;  (c)  If  there 
was  a  time  when  there  was  no  knowing  being,  it  is  impossi- 
ble that  any  knowing  being  ever  could  have  been.  That  is 
to  say,  only  mind  can  be  the  cause  of  mind. 

Lock's  argument  deserves  consideration.  It  presents  to 
us  a  choice  of  hypotheses.  Either  God  the  prius  and  pos- 
tulate of  all  intelligence  exists;  or  else  there  was  a  time 
when  there  was  no  knowing  being  in  the  universe.  And 
though  the  advocate  of  evolution  would  not  say  that  it  is  as 
impossible  for  mind  to  be  the  product  of  matter  as  for  the 
three  angles  of  a  triangle  not  to  be  equal  to  two  right  angles, 
yet  he  must  choose  between  an  Infinite  Intelligence  and 
some  maximum  finite  intelligence.  (See  Kirkman.  Phil- 
osophy without  Assumptions.)  How  knowledge  could  ever 
have  arisen  had  there  not  been  an  externally  existing  know- 
ing being,  is  a  question  that  has  not  been  answered  since 
Locke's  day;  and,  slightly  changing  the  form  of  Locke's 
alternatives,  may  we  not  say  that  his  argument  still  presents 
to  us  the  choice  between  Theism  and  "the  most  thorough- 
paced Agnosticism  \ 


)>W-V^^    -  &JO  "H^U  -*X  ^A—  S^JZ  *-+&*.    ,        ^    J" 


(^rVK 


23 


Schwegler  represents  Samuel  Clarke  as  belonging  to  the 
School  of  John  Locke,  but  scarcely  on  sufficienl  grounds 
(See  Encyc.  Brit)     Clark's  argument  is  oil,,,  represented 
£  ontoUical,  bu   it  is  hardly  that.     It  is  a  combination  of 
fp^MdapMfcrtorfargumentB.    The  steps  in  the  argu- 
ment  are  these  : 
(a)  Something  has  existed  from  eternity. 
6    That  something  is  immutable  and  independent. 
(c)  Existing    without   external    cause  of  its  existence,  it 

must  be  self  existent ;  i. «'.,  necessarily  existent. 
Id)  What  its  substance  is  we  do  not  know  ;  but  some  ot 

its  attributes  are  demonstrable. 
(e)  The  self-existent   must   he   infinite,   must   be   eternal, 

must  be  one,  etc.  .  _, 

So  far  Spinoza  would  have  made  no  objection  the 
nroblem  of  Theism  is  to  invest  the  One  with  intelligence 
and  free  will  Clarke  admits  the  difficulty  of  don,,'  tins  by 
a  pin  argnments,  though  it  is  easily  done  by  a  posteriori 
reasonns  He  uses,  therefore,  the  ordinary  aetiological 
arsumenf  employs  Aristotle's  argument  from  motion,  and 
affi  s  1  e  impossibility  ot  matter  producing  mind.  Clarke's 
aliment  is  a  strong  one.  Not  new.  hut  a  new  synthesis  of 
olf  arguments,  amHleservedly  holds  classical  rankin  theistic 

^Kaiit^criticism  of  theistic  proofs  marks  an  era  in  the 
iit^urSe°of  this  subject,  because  it  was  %*£%*£* 
state  and  classify  all  possible  arguments  tor  God  s  existence, 
because  t  is  the  most  thorough  criticism  of  these  proofs  to 
be  found anywhere;  and  because  of  the  effect  produced  by 
h-some,  »  a  consequence,  falling  hack  on  authority, others 
on  intuition. 

The  criticism  embraces  these  points  : 

1  That  there  can  be  but  three  arguments  open  to  the 
speculative  reason,  in  proof  of  God's  existence:  th tolog- 

resolvable  into  the  ontological;  so  thai,  strictly  peaking, 

all  speculative  proof  is  the   proof  commonly   known   a,   tie 
Anselmian,  or  Cartesian. 

The  only  points  that  concern  us  are  (2)  and  fd). 


24 

Kant  criticises  the  several  proofs  in  succession.  His  objec- 
tions to  the  ontological  argument  are,  in  the  main,  those 
already  referred  to.     (See  Anselm.) 

(a)  The  illustrations  of  correspondence  between  subjective 

and  objective,  have  been  drawn  from  judgments,  not 
from  Things.  Thus,  in  that  of  the  triangle,  the 
proposition  is  not  that  the  triangle  exists,  but  that  if 
it  exist,  its  three  angles,  etc.  So  ot  the  perfect 
Being. 

(b)  It  is  absurd  to  introduce  into  the  conception  of  a  thing 

cogitated  solely  in  reference  to  its  possibility,  the 
conception  of  its  existence.  This  he  shows  by  asking 
whether  the  proposition,  this  thing  exists,  is  analytic 
or  synthetic.  If  it  is  analytic,  we  must  either  iden- 
tify our  thought  and  the  thing,  or  else  we  must  as- 
sume that  the  thing  exists,  so  making  it  a  predicate 
which  is  repeated  in  the  proposition.  If,  however,, 
it  is  synthetic,  there  is  no  contradiction  in  removing 
the  predicate.  But  the  ontological  argument  pro- 
ceeds on  the  assumption  that  the  proposition  is  ana- 
lytical. 

(c)  Kant  says,  also,  that  existence  is  not  a  real  predicate — 

distinguishing  between  a  logical  and  a  real  predicate. 
A    real    predicate    adds   something   to   the    concept. 
Existence  does  not  do  this.     If  existence  were  a  real 
predicate,  there  never  could  be  a  correspondence  be- 
tween the  concept  and   its  object,   since  the  object 
would  always  be  greater  than  the  concept. 
Kant's  objections  against  the   ontological   argument  are 
valid,  so  long  as  dialectical  objectivity  is  sought  by  means 
of  it.     But  Kant  does  not  set  aside  the  argument  found  in 
the  irresistible  tendency  of  the  mind  to  think  of  an  Infinite 
Being,  of  which  the  ontological  argument  is  only  a  syllo- 
gistic expression.     Kant's  "  dollars"  and  Gaunilo's  "  island" 
are,  so  far  as  this  is  concerned,  hardly   analogous  to  this 
necessary  idea  of  the  Infinite. 

The  cosmological  argument  is  characterized  by  Kant,  as 
containing  a  "  perfect  nest  of  dialectical  assumptions." 

Among  these  dialectical  assumptions  are  to  be  found  the 
following;  (1)  That  the  doctrine  of  cause  and  effect  trans- 
cends experience.  (2)  That  an  infinite  regress  of  finite 
causes  is  impossible,  etc. 


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25 

But  the  strongest  objection  to  the  coBmological  argumenl 
is  that  it  is  identical  with  the  ontological,and  therefore  tails 
under  the  same  condemnation. 

The  objections  to  the  teleological  argumenl  are  no1  for- 
midable,  and  may  all  be  conceded  without  destroying  the 
value  of  the  argument,  which  Kant  describesas  "theoldest, 
the  clearest,  and  the  most  in  conformity  with  the  com- 
mon reason  of  humanity."  Reserving  the  right  to  criticise 
the  argument  on  the  ground  that  it  proceeds  on  a  basis 
of  analogical  reasoning,  he  calls  attention  to  the  following 

points :  .  . 

1  The  order  and  harmony  of  the  world  evidence  the  con- 
tingency of  its  form,  not  of  its  matter.  It  is  impossible, 
therefore,  to  deduce  a  creator  of  matter:  the  mo*1  we  can 
get  is  an  arranger  of  matter— an  architect. 

2.  From  the  order  and  harmony  of  the  universe  we  may 
infer  the  existence  of  a  cause  proportionate  thereto.  Lnat 
is  to  say:  we  cannot  infer  from  the  order  oi  the  umv< 
that  the  cause  of  that  order  is  infinite.  To  this  it  is  neces- 
sary to  reply  that  every  theistic  argument  is  not  intended  to 
proVe  the  whole  theistic  position,  and  that  the  mtmity 
of  God  can  he  reached  through  other  arguments  than  tne 

teleological.  .- 

„    /"The  least  noticed,  but  most  subtle  form  of  the  Kantian 
5  Criticism  of  the  theistic  proofs  is  that  in  which  he  attempts 
*f /to   reduce   them    all   to   the    ontologies).     In  making   this 
/attempt  he  not  only  fails,  but  betrsys  inconsistency.     So 
after  speaking  of  "  that  unfortunate  ontological  argument, 
fn  mosPt  dbpagragiug  terms  he  identifies  with  it  the  te U 
deal  argument  which  he  had  Bpoken  ol  as  one  ths      always 
Ever  to  be  mentioned  with  respect."     But  .tie  difficuU 
to  see  how  Kant  establish.',  the  identity  ol  these  three  forms 

to  infer  a  cause  proportionate  to  the  "order  and  design  <  mole 
n  the  universe.'     V.ut  he  says,  this  cause  must  be .regarded 
as  the  conception  of  an  all-sufficient   being.     But  an  si 

^uffidenSgweca, t  infer  fr the  order  snd de«gn 

visible  to  us,  i.  e.  from  exper.euce     And  so     u      .  m        - 
the  wisdom  and  other  attributes  of  the  author  of the .world 
order  we  leave  the  ground  of  empiricism  and  infe.  th    con 

tingency  of  the  world  from  tl der  that  is  observable      i 

F romX  contingency,  and  by  the  help  ol  trsnscendeatsl 


26 

conceptions  alone,  we  infer  the  existence  of  something  abso- 
lutely necessary,  and  tk  still  advancing,  proceed  from  the 
absolute  necessity  of  the  first  cause  to  the  completely  deter- 
mined or  determining  conception  thereof,  the  conception  of 
an  all-embracing  reality." 

This  is  Kant's  account  of  the  way  in  which  the  "  physico- 
theological,  failing  in  its  undertaking  recurs  in  its  embar- 
rassment to  the  cosmological  argument." 

But  observe:  these  three  arguments  may  supplement 
each  other,  and  may  severally  contribute  to  the  support  of 
the  theistic  position  without  being  identical.  Kant's  argu- 
ment only  goes  to  show  that  they  are  mutually  auxiliary. 
He  fails  to  make  out  the  identity  of  the  physico-thelogical 
and  the  cosmological  proof. 

For,  if  the  order  and  finality  of  the  universe  demand  as 
a  cause  proportionate  thereto  an  all-sufficient  being,  the 
physico-theological  argument  by  this  very  concession  must 
be  held  as  offering  a  fair  proof  of  the  existence  of  such  a 
being.  In  that  case  it  is 'clearly  under  no  obligation  to  the 
cosmological  argument.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  as  Kant 
would  seem  at  first  to  imply,  the  order  and  finality  of  the 
world  demand  a  cause  only  proportionate  thereto;  if  that  is 
to  say,  the}'  do  not  necessarily  demand  an  infinite  or  all- 
sufficient  cause  :  then  it  is  not  an  objection  against  the 
physico-theological  proof  that  it  will  not  justify  us  in  infer- 
ring an  all-sufficient  cause;  and  again,  it  is  not  under  obli- 
gation to,  and  still  less  is  it  identical  with  the  cosmological 
argument. 

Kant  fails  equally  in  the  attempt  to  identify  the  cosmo- 
logical and  ontological  proofs.  The  cosmological  argument 
proceeding  empirically,  infers  the  existence  of  a  necessary 
being.  But  it  gives  no  information  concerning  the  nature 
of  that  being.  It  leaves  experience  in  order  to  seek  a  con- 
ception adequate  to  that  of  a  necessary  being,  and  finds  it  in 
the  ens  realissimum. 

If  now  Kant  had  said  there  is  an  a  -priori  as  well  as  an 
a  -posteriori  element  in  the  cosmological  argument,  no  objec- 
tion could  be  made.  But  he  says  that  in  identifying  the 
ens  realissimum  with  the  necessary  being,  we  are  returning 
to  the  ontological  argument.  For,  he  continues,  when  we 
say  that  the  conception  of  ens  realissimum  is  adequate  to  the 
conception  of  a  necessary  being,  we  assume  that  we  can 
infer  the  latter  from  the  former.     The  argument  which  pro- 


27 

fesses  to  be  cosmological  and  to  proceed  from  experience  is 
thus  covertly  ontological  (Critique,  Meiklejohn'a  trans,  p 

373). 

But  this  is  not  the  case.  The  conception  of  an  ens  real- 
issimum  is  that  of  a  being  necessarily  existing.  But  that 
is  no  proof  that  the  necessary  being  exists  ana  the  cosmo- 
logical argument  does  not  proceed  upon  that  assumption. 
The  most  that  can  be  said  is  that  the  ontological  argumenl 
gives  us  the  conception  ot  an  ens  realissimum  as  of  a  being 
necessarily  existing,  but  is  impotent  so  tar  as  proving  the 
existence  of  that  being  is  concerned  ;  that  the  cosmological 
argument  proves  the  existence  of  a  necessary  being  but  that 
it  cannot  give  any  determinate  conception  of  that  being; 
and  that  the  two  arguments  unite  in  the  theistie  proof. 
Closely  related  they  undoubtedly  are,  but  identical  they  are 
not. 

In  other  words:  A  priori  we  know  that  if  a  necessary 
being  exists  it  must  be  ens  realissimum ;  but  from  the  idea 
of  ens  realissimum  and  its  corresponding  conception  of  ne- 
cessary existence,  we  cannot  pass  10  the  objective  reality. 
A  posteriori,  however,  we  are  led  to  infer  the  existence  of  a 
necessary  being. 


9^     v  -^t^ 


C^rvA^trz^A  CiA^-ct       ^/Un^i     ^-u- 

(ft  .Qu    ts^    ^r^J^^ 


THEISM. 


PART  II.     CONSTRUCTIVE. 

The  two  questions  to  be  dealt  with  in  this  division  of  our 
subject  are  (1)  tbe  existence  of  God  and  (2)  the  relation  of 
God  to  the  world. 

I.    The  Existence  of  God. 

Notice  the  proper  argumentative  attitude  in  reference  to 

theistic  proof. 

^  1.  In  giving  a  reasoned  account  of  theistic  belief  we  do 
not  prejudge  the  question  as  to  its  genesis.  Tin*  question 
is:  Given  an  antecedent  belief  in  God,  due  to  whatever 
cause,  whether  that  belief  can  be  corroborated  by  argument. 

2.  We  do  not  undertake  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of 
God.  Physicus  says  that  theism  is  not  rationally  probable. 
We  affirm  that  it  is.  We  maintain  that  theism  can  be 
rationally  justified  and  that  atheism  is  unreasonable. 

3.  The  theistic  argument  is  complex  and  cumulative.  In 
theistic  proof  each  argument  gives  adequate  reason  for  the 
theistic  conclusion ;  but  this  conclusion  is  strengthened  by 
the  conffruitv  and  concurrence  of  all  the  arguments. 

The  theistic  proof  may  be  arranged  under  three  principal 
divisions.  First:  Argument  based  on  idea  of  cause;  Sec- 
ond: Argument  founded  on  our  moral  nature;  Third: 
Argument  based  on  idea  of  the  Infinite. 

Division  I. — Argument  Based  on  Idea  of  Cause. 

Regarding  the  world  under  the  concept  of  causation,  we 
may  consider  it  first  as  contingent;  secondly  as  a  cosmos; 
thirdly  as  exhibiting  finality.  Argument  based  on  the  causal 
judgment  will  therefore  take  3  forms  :  ^Etiological,  Cosmo- 
logical,  Teleological. 

A.    The  ^Etiological  Argument. 

This  treats  pheuomena  simply  as  contingent^  and  may  be 
considered  in  two  ways:  as  applied  to  the  totality  of  phe- 
nomena or  applied  to  specific  phenomena.     We,  therefore, 

consider  first: — 


30 

Basis  of  Theistic  Inference  in  the  Totality  of  Phe- 
nomena. 

Syllogism.  Every  effect  has  a  cause.  The  world  is  an 
effect,  &c.  But  is  the  world  au  effect?  Difficult  to  prove 
this  if  by  '  world  '  we  mean  the  substance  of  the  world. 
Hence  some  say  the  {etiological  argument  is  useless  because 
it  assumes  the  non-eternity  of  matter.  But  we  are  not 
required  to  raise  this  question.  The  world  of  our  experience 
is  one  of  phenomenal  successions  in  time  and  co-existences 
in  space.  Does  this  world  demand  a  first  cause ;  if  so  what 
cause  ?  Answer  to  this  depends  upon  what  is  meant  by 
causation.  We  notice  therefore  the  leading  theories  of  cau- 
sation. 

1.  Mill's  Theory.  Mills  (J.  S.)  says  that  "  the  very  essence  IW*  I  J 
of  causation  is  incompatible  with  a  first  cause."  "  The  cause 
of  any  change  is  a  prior  change."  "  When  I  speak  of  the 
cause  of  a  phenomenon  I  do  not  mean  a  cause  which  is  not 
itself  a  phenomenon."  By  causation  Mill  means  only  the 
relationships  of  phenomena  in  time-successions.  His  theory 
being  conceded  the  impossibility  of  inferring  a  first  cause 
undoubtedly  follows.  But  to  his  theory  in  its  relations  to 
theism  we  offer  these  objections. 

(a)  Cause  and  effect  express  relations  (according  to  Mill) 
between  phenomena.  God  as  first  cause  is  thus  ruled  out  by 
definition. 

(b)  Cause  and  effect  express  time-relations  of  phenomena. 
It  is  the  fact  that  A  is  the  invariable  predecessor  under  cer- 
tain circumstances  of  B  that  makes  it  possible  to  call  A  the 
cause  of  B.  But  the  essence  of  causation  is  not  in  invariable 
relationship  of  succession  for  this  invariability  might  be  pre- 
served where  there  is  no  suggestion  of  cause  and  effect. 

(c)  Mill  is  shut  up  to  an  infinite  regress  of  finite  causes. 
A  cause  is  only  a  phenomenon  and  every  phenomenon  that 
begins  to  be  has  a  cause. 

(d)  There  can  be  no  law  of  cause  and  effect  under  con- 
ditions where  the  law  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  is  not  in 
force.  Were  events  to  happen  without  regularity,  there 
would  be  in  Mill's  view  a  suspension  of  the  law  of  cause 
and  effect.  But  no :  the  occurrence  of  an  event  makes  it 
imperative  to  call  for  a  cause.  It  is  the  fact  that  the  event 
has  hap/u  nedj  not  that  it  has  happened  regularly  that  makes 
it  necessary  to  ask  for  its  cause. 


31 

(e.)  Mill  violates  the  principles  of  bis  own  empirical  phi- 
losophy and  contradicts  his  doctrine  of  causation  by  appeal- 
ing to  what  he  calls  a  permanent  clement  in  nature. 
"There  is  a  nature,  a  permanent  clement  and  also  a  change- 
able :  the  changes  are  always  the  effects  <>f  previous  changi  -. 
The  permanent  existences,  so  far  as  we  know,  are  not  effects 
at  all."  Query:  1.  [f  knowledge  is  limited  by  experience, 
what  do  we  know  ot*  a  permanent  in  Nature? 

2.  If  this  permanent,  which  is  not  an  effect,  he  "cause  or 
non-cause  of  everything  that  takes  place,"  how  can  it  be 
true  that  every  cause  is  also  an  effect  ? 

(/.)  It  would  he  impossible,  as  Mr.  Shute  has  shown, 
according  to  Mill's  definition  of  cause,  ever  to  discover  a 
cause.  For,  according  to  this  doctrine,  the  cause  ot'  a  phe- 
nomenon is  not  a  single  antecedent  and  necessarily  related 
phenomenon  :  but  that  phenomenon  as  conditioned  by  all  the 
circumstances  near  and  more  remote  which  have  effected  it. 

Mill's  doctrine  amounts  to  saving  that  the  physical  uni- 
verse at  any  one  moment  is  the  effect  ot'  all  physical  ante- 
cedents for  all  past  time.  Clearly  from  this  view  ot'  causa- 
tion we  can  infer  no  first  cause.  It'  the  only  causes  of 
phenomena  be  themselves  phenomena  demanding  causes  in 
explanation  of  them,  then  an  uncaused  cause  is  absurd. 

2.  Theory  of  pure  physical  causation.  If  the  (actors  of 
the  universe  be  matter  and  motion,  then  cause  can  only 
mean  the  phenomenal  antecedents  necessary  to  certain  con- 
sequents. And  we  conclude  (1)  every  physical  phenomenon 
is  necessarily  determined  by  physical  antecedents  :  (2)  there 
has  been  an  infinite  regress  of  physical  antecedents  :  (3)  all 
so-called  free  actions  have  been  physically  determined.  A 
first  cause  in  the  sense  demanded  by  theism  is  impossible. 
Moreover  the  free  action  of  our  own  wills  is  obliterated 
and  our  volitions  take  their  place  in  a  row  of  physical  ante- 
cedents. 

3.  Theory  of  the  persistence  of  Force.  A-  taught  by 
Spencer  it  is  the  doctrine  that  all  forms  of  existence  are  the 
manifestations  of  a  power  at  once  omnipotent  and  incom- 
prehensible. "In  this  consciousness  of  an  omnipotent 
power  we  have  that  consciousness  in  which  Religion  dwell.-. 
ami  so  we  arrive  at  that  point  where  Religion  and  Science 
coalesce"  (Spencer).  We  agree  with  Diman  in  saying 
that  the  doctrine  of  a  first  cause  has  not  been  wiped  out 
by  the  doctrine  of  force.     It  the  idea  of  causation  yielded 


32 

this  and  nothing  more,  that  there  is  an  incomprehensible 
but  omnipotent  power  that  is  the  ultimate  cause  of  all  phe- 
nomeonon,  we  should  use  this  as  the  basis  of  a  theistic 
argument.  But  there  are  objections  to  this  view  of  causa- 
tion. It  is  half  way  between  theism  and  materialism.  If 
Force  be  an  entity  distinct  from  matter  and  its  manifesta- 
tions, the  difference  between  this  theory  and  theism  is  that 
force  is  not  invested  with  the  attributes  of  Intelligence.  The 
theory  as  thus  understood  is  semi-theistic,  and  consistency 
will  require  it  to  advance  to  the  full  theistic  position.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  Force  be  not  an  entity  but  a  term  express- 
ing rate  or  ratio  of  motion,  work  clone,  &c,  the  theory 
resolves  itself  into  that  of  pure  physical  causation.  This 
again  is  physical  determinism,  and  to  be  complete,  must 
include  mind  and  will.  If,  however,  volition  be  not  capa- 
ble of  physical  expiation,  as  it  is  not,  then  we  have  a  large 
area  of  effects  which  cannot  be  explained  by  the  doctrine  of 
the  persistence  of  Force.  Physical  causation  in  other  words 
is  not  the  only  causation. 

4.  Accordingly  we  have  the  common  doctrine  of  dual  cau- 
sation which  recognizes  will  as  a  cause — a  first  cause,  and 
physical  phenomena  as  second  causes.  It  is  held  by  many 
that  personal  agency  is  the  type  of  all  causation  :  that  we 
speak  of  physical  causes  because  we  impute  to  matter  a 
power  akin  to  that  of  which  we  are  conscious  when  we  effect 
change  by  the  exercise  of  our  wills.  But  whatever  be  the 
truth  respecting  the  nature  of  physical  causation,  the  theistic 
argument  based  upon  cause  derives  its  force  from  our  expe- 
rience of  personal  agency.  The  etiological  argument  is 
simply  the  Aristotelian  argument  for  a  first  mover.  From 
our  experience  of  power  and  from  our  belief  in  regard  to 
the  inability  of  matter  to  originate  motion,  we  are  led  to 
believe  that  however  related  to  one  another  physical  phe- 
nomena may  be,  there  must  behind  them  all  be  a  will  as  the 
original  cause  of  motion. 

5.  Volitional  theory  of  causation.  It  is  held  by  many  that 
the  only  real  cause  in  the  world  is  a  will.  Whether  this 
volitional  theory  of  causation  be  accepted  or  not,  and  whether 
an  infinite  regress  of  physical  antecedents  be  thinkable  or 
not,  it  is  certain  that  the  mind  naturally  seeks  for  a  case  of 
real  beginning.  We  are  not  satisfied  with  a  cause  that  is 
also  an  effect.  It  is  certain  that  the  only  thing  in  experience 
answering  to  this  demand  is  our  will.     So  that  contemplat- 


bXJU.       UT-    <*&^~>      y^sOX^. 


33 

ing  the  world  of  phenomena — antecedents  and  consequents — 

we  are  left  to  accept  an  infinite  regress  of  physical  causes, 
or  to  believe  that  physical  change  is  directly  or  more 
remotely  related  to  the  will. 

The  argument  a  contingentia  mundi  concerns  phenomena. 
It  does  not  concern  itself  with  the  question  of  substance  or 
the  eternity  of  matter.  The  non-eternity  of  matter  may  be 
argued  on  the  ground  of  the  law  of  parsimony  (that  is,  the- 
ism being  conceded,  there  is  no  need  of  believing  in  the 
eternity  of  matter),  as  following  from  the  doctrine  of  the  dis- 
sipation of  energy,  or  on  the  ground  of  a  dynamic  theory  of 
matter:  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  know  that  atoms  had  a 
beginning  in  order  to  come  to  the  theistic  inference  through 
the  doctrine  of  causation.     We  consider  next: 

Basis  of  Theistic  Inference  in  Specific  Phenomena. 

Certain  phenomena,  because  they  cannot  be  accounted  for 
by  antecedent  physical  phenomena,  suggest,  if  they  do  not 
require,  the  hypothesis  of  the  divine  intelligence  for  their  ex- 
planation. Existence  of  life  and  the  human  mind  are  exam- 
ples of  these.  Arguments  for  divine  existence  based  upon 
the  human  mind  have  been  presented  in  two  forms  ;  by  John 
Locke  and  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton.  Locke's  argument,  given 
in  Part  L,  criticised  by  Physicus,  who  says  that  we  have  no 
proof  that  only  mind  can  produce  mind  ;  and  moreover, 
that  it  is  as  inconceivable  that  mind  should  be  the  cause  ot 
matter  as  that  matter  should  be  the  cause  of  mind.  This, 
however,  is  easily  said,  and  for  reply,  each  must  refer  to  his 
own  consciousness. 

Hamilton's  argument  is  founded  in  the  incom  measurable 
character  of  the  attributes  of  mind  and  matter.  From  mind 
.in  man  he  found  the  passage  easy  to  mind  in  nature. 
/Hamilton  erred  in  discouraging  all  other  theistic  proof. 
But  his  argument  is  not  without  force,  and  it  cannot  be 
answered  except  by  teaching  physical  determinism.  In 
other  words,  unless  materialism  succeeds  in  making  men 
skeptical  about  their  own  minds  there  will  always  be  an 
open  way  from  mind  in  man  to  the  mind  of  God. 

B.     The  Cosmolouical  Argument. 

Distinguish  between  the   argument    based  on   order   and 
that  based  on  final  causes.  All  cases  of  finality  are  instances 


34 

of  order,  but  all  instances  of  order  are  not  adaptations  of  y 
means  to  ends.  Neither  the  cosniological  nor  the  teleolog- 
ical  argument  is  affected  by  a  mechanical  explanation  of  the 
facts  of  the  world.  In  cosniological  argument  we  see  order 
and  infer  a  plan  antecedently  existing  in  an  intelligent  mind. 
In  the  teleological  argument  we  see  adaptation  of  means  to 
ends  and  infer  finality  and  also  infer  mind  as  the  cause  of 
that  finality.  The  cosmological  argument,  that  is  to  say,  the 
argument  based  upon  order,  proceeds  upon  the  assumption 
that  order  is  the  product  of  mind.  The  order  of  the  world 
is  a  great  fact.  Time,  number,  rate,  ratio  and  volume,  are 
all  matters  of  most  definite  and  precise  nature,  and  the 
physical  world  is  an  exhibition  on  the  grandest  scale  of 
mathematical  relations.  The  fact  of  order  is  undeniable. 
Some  explanation  of  the  fact  is  demanded.  Theism  is  the 
natural  explanation.  Those,  however,  who  deny  the  theistic 
inference  offer  the  following  substitutes  for  it: 

1.  The  theory  of  Chance.  Suppose  we  were  to  concede 
the  possibility  that  by  a  purely  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms 
the  cosmos  might  have  resulted.  How  much  would  theism 
be  damaged  ?  We  should  say  that  the  credulity  of  the  atheist 
was  amazing.  "  Imagine,"  says  Venn,  "some  being  not  a 
creator,  but  a  sort  of  demiurgus  who  has  a  quantity  of 
materials  put  into  his  hand  and  he  assigns  them  their  collo- 
cations and  lines  of  action  blindly  and  at  haphazard;  what 
are  the  odds  that  such  a  world  as  we  actually  experience 
should  have  been  brought  about  in  this  way  ? "  His  answer 
is  that  "  all  the  paper  which  the  world  has  hitherto  produced 
would  be  used  up  before  we  got  far  on  the  way  in  writing 
them  down." 

2.  The  theory  of  law.  The  Duke  of  Argyll  shows  in  his 
Reign  of  Law  howT  we  advance  from  the  mere  conception  of 
order  to  the  idea  of  force  or  power  in  explanation  of  the 
order.  We  are  not  satisfied  to  say  that  bodies  move  with  a 
certain  regularity — we  seek  an  explanation  of  this  regularity 
and  embody  it  in  a  formula.  Then  we  are  not  satisfied  with 
the  formula — but  we  impute  the  fact  to  a  force  which  we 
call  the  Law  of  Gravitation.  But  however  the  word  Law  is 
used,  it  does  not  affect  theism,  for  if  it  be  not  used  in  some 
transcendental  way  it  means  only  the  order  of  sequence. 
If  it  means  more  than  order  it  is  because  it  has  been  hypos- 
tatised  and  treated  as  an  entity.  So  that  the  idea  of  law 
leaves  us  where  we  were  before.     We  must  be  content  to  do 


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35 

■without  an  explanation  of  the  world's  order,  or  we  must 
find  an  explanation  in  Theism.  The  world's  order  is  proof 
of  mind.  "That  which  it  requires  thought  and  reason  to 
understand  must  itself  bo  thought  and  reason.  That  which 
mind  alone  can  investigate  or  express  musl  be  itself  mind." 
This  is  Baden  Powell's  way  of  putting  the  cosmological 
argument. 

3.  Theory  of  the  persistence  of  force.  A  mechanical  con- 
ception of  the  universe  is  in  the  highest  degree  theistic, 
provided  that  mechanical  conception  does  not  include  mind. 
The  objection  made  by  Physicus  proceeds  upon  the  assump- 
tion that  mind  has  a  physical  genesis.  The  theory  of  the  per- 
sistence of  force,  carried  to  its  logical  conclusion.-,  reduces 
the  universe  to  matter  and  motion.  .  If  mind  in  man  be 
denied,  the  Divine  mind,  of  course,  will  not  be  believed 
in.  No  proof  of  the  Divine  existence  can  survive  belief  in 
the  human  mind.  The  theory  of  the  persistence  of  force 
when  carried  the  length  of  materialistic  monism,  blots  out 
/  the  theistic  argument  as  Physicus  shows.  It  blots  out  belief 
by  blotting  out  the  basis  of  belief.  But  it  blots  out  the 
possibility  of  rational  belief  in  anything  including  the  per- 
sistence of  force.  2^, 

C.     Teleological  Argument. 

Commonly  known  as  argument  from  final  cause  <>r  design. 
By  final  cause  is  meant  the  end  for  which  a  thing  or  an 
event  exists.  Distinguished  thus  from  efficient  cause  which 
always  means  the  agency  by  which  anything  is  brought 
about.  Following  Janet  we  consider  the  teleological  argu- 
ment by  instituting  two  inquiries  : 

1.  Is  finality  a  law  of  nature  ? 

2.  What  is  the  cause  of  this  finality  ? 

I.  Is  finality  a  law  of  Nature  ?  Consider  first,  the  nature 
of  the  process  by  which  we  are  led  to  believe  that  there  are 
ends  in  nature:  Secondly,  the  specific  proofs  in  support  oi 
finality;  Thirdly,  the  objections  to  the  doctrine  of  finality. 

1.  Nature  of  teleological  argument.  Porter  holds  (inclu- 
sively) that  the  idea  of  final  cause  is  an  intuition.  Mill 
says  that  it  is  an  inductive  argument  according  to  the 
method  of  agreement.  The  latter  view  probably  correct. 
We  are  under  no  necessity  to  ask  for  the  final  cause  as  we 
are  for  the  efficient  cause  of  every  phenomenon.  In  teleo- 
logical  reasoning  we  argue  analogically.      The  argument 


/ 


36 

has  two  stages.  In  the  first  place  we  know  from  our  expe- 
rience that  a  certain  ideal  future  to  be  brought  about  stands 
related  to  certain  means  necessary  to  the  accomplishing  of 
this  result.  A  and  B  are  related  to  each  other  as  means 
and  ends.  Passing  from  our  own  consciousness  to  facts 
outside  of  consciousness,  we  see  phenomena  related  in  a 
way  that  irresistibly  suggests  the  relation  of  means  and 
ends  :  we  say  B  was  the  final  cause  of  A.  The  first  stage  in 
the  argument  ends  in  the  realization  of  finality  as  a  law  of 
nature.  The  phenomena  of  the  world  look  as  if  they  were 
respectively  means  and  ends.  The  next  question  is  as  to 
the  cause  of  the  finality.  Again  we  revert  to  our  expe- 
rience, and  since  the  only  finality  of  which  we  have  any 
knowledge  is  that  of  a  purposing  mind— in  other  words, 
since  finality  implies  intentionality  in  our  conscious  experi- 
ence, the  inference  from  finality  to  intentionality  is  rational 
if  not  necessary. 

2.  Specific  evidence  of  finality.  The  proof  of  finality  con- 
sists in  the  cumulative  force  of  a  great  multitude  of  as  ifs. 
It  looks  as  if  the  wide  domain  of  nature  were  a  great  system 
of  ideals,  as  if  striving  toward  an  end  were  the  great  char- 
acteristic of  nature.  To  prove  finality  we  begin  with  the 
purposive  action  of  which  we  are  ourselves  conscious.  Then 
we  see  actions  of  our  fellow  men  which  seem  to  be  dictated 
by  purpose  and  directed  to  attain  an  end.  Descending  a  . 
step,  the  actions  of  the  lower  animals  irresistibly  impress  ' 
us  as  purposive.  Lower  still  we  come  to  a  point  where  the  fl, 
action  as  definitely  suggests  adaptation,  though  we  do  not 
credit  the  animal  with  intention.  Analogy  thus  suggests 
that  action  with  reference  to  results,  whether  consciously  or 
unconsciously,  is  everywhere  manifest  throughout  animal 
life.  We  turn  then  to  the  relation  of  organ  to  function; 
the  relation  of  the  eye  to  vision.  We  find  that  there  is  a 
close  and  apparent^  premeditated  relation  between  organ 
and  organism,  organism  and  environment.  We  argue : 
These  adaptations  are  not  accidents.  They  are  intentional. 
They  bespeak  purpose  and  designing  mind,  The  same 
teleological  trend  of  things  is  manifest  in  the  world.  Things 
in  the  world  sustain  a  relation  of  lower  and  higher.  Final- 
ity in  nature  is  proved  by  showing  that  there  is  the  closest 
analogy  between  the  relation  of  part  and  part,  and  part  and 
whole,  in  the  organic  world,  that  there  is  between  means 
and  ends  in  the  sphere  of  our  purposive  action. 


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37 

3.  Objections  to  the  doctrine  of  final  causes.  These  fall 
under  three  classes. 

1.  Irrelevant  objections: 

(a.)  Bacon's  often  quoted  objection  docs  not  apply  to  final 
cause  as  a  fact,  but  to  the  Bearch  for  final  cause  as  a  scientific 
method.     All  that  Bacon  Bays  may  be  conceded. 

(6)  So  of  Descartes'  objection.  Be  says  we  are  ignorant 
of  ends.  So  we  are.  Audit  we  were  pretending  to  know 
the  final  cause  of  every  event  the  objection  would  be4  valid. 

(c.)  Irrelevant,  also,  the  objection  that  the  doctrine  of  final 
cause  assumes  that  man  is  the  final  cause  of  creation.  It  is 
surely  not  necessary  to  hold  that  every  thing  was  made  for 
man,  because  man's  eye  was  made  tor  seeing. 

(d)  Nor  can  we  get  rid  of  final  cause,  because  some  have 
abused  it.  Some  have  treated  every  possible  use  of  an  organ 
as  an  intended  use,  and   in    this  way   have   heaped    ridicule 
upon  teleology. 
^W   2.  Biological  objections. 

It  is  said  that  the  doctrine  of  final  cause  is  hard  to  recon- 
cile wdth  the  rudimentary  and  useless  organs  to  be  found  in 
animals.     To  this  objection  it  is  replied  : 

1.  It  is  not  affirmed  that  every  detail  of  organization  was 
meant  to  serve  a  useful  purpose.  2.  We  do  not  know  that 
an  organ  has  no  uses  because  we  do  not  see  its  uses.  3. 
Obvious  finality  in  a  multitude  of  cases  is  not  set  aside  by 
apparent  lack  of  finality  in  other  cases.  4.  These  rudimen- 
tary organs  are  explainable  without  denying  teleology  ;  and 
by  some  are  so  explained  so  as  to  give  emphasis  to  the 
teleological  idea. 

3.  Objections  urged  by  the  anti  teleological   evolutionists. 

Whether  evolution  be  true  is  not  the  question.  It  true, 
is  it  contradictory  to  teleology?  Can  it  dispense  with 
teleology  ? 

Janet  and  others  hold  that  evolution,  in  the  first  place, 
does  not  contradict  teleology.  The  process  of  evolution, 
conceding  the  truth  of  the  hypothesis,  is  only  a  mode  of  the 
Divine  procedure.  That  is  to  say,  the  order,  the  adaptations, 
the  harmonies  of  the  world  are  here  and  are  manifest,  and 
they  suggest  God,  whatever  the  process  may  have  been  by 
which  they  have  been  brought  about.  But  twoquestions  are 
to  be  distinguished.  It  is  one  thing  to  say  that  the  doctrine 
of  evolution"  tolerates  theism,  and  another  thing  to  Bay  that 
it  gives  support  to  theism.     It  belief  in  God  <an  be  arrived 


^H 


38 

at  through  other  channels,  undoubtedly  it  is  possible  to  say, 
and  it  is  the  correct  thing  to  say,  that  evolution  is  only  the 
mode  of  His  working. 

But  the  more  important  question  is,  whether  evolution, 
in  itself  considered,  is  or  is  not  antagonistic  to  teleology. 
This  question  has  been  specifically  raised  in  regard  to  Dar- 
win's dot-trine  of  the  Origin  of  Species.  Upon  this  subject 
two  things  are  to  be  said  : 

(a.)  That  the  unmodified  Darwinian  doctrine  of  tendency 
to  indefinite  variation  in  all  directions  as  the  foundation  of 
species  ends  in  giving  us  a  chance  world,  so  far  as  biology  is 
concerned.     It  is  anti-teleological,  therefore. 

(/>.)  That  if  variation  be  not  in  all  directions;  if  there  has 
been  a  law  of  variation  ;  a  law  of  selection  manifest;  if  it  is 
in  accordance  with  some  inner  law  of  developement  that  the 
present  system  of  ordered  life  has  grown  up,  there  is  a 
teleological  principle  evidently  at  work  in  nature.  This 
view  is  held  by  many,  and  this  is  what  Janet  means  when  he 
affirms  that  the  doctrine  of  evolution  cannot  dispense  with 
teleology. 

II.    What  is  the  Explanation  of  the  Finality  in    Nature. 

To  this  question  four  answers  have  been  given  :  1.  Sub- 
jective finality.  2.  Immanent  finality.  3.  Unconscious  fin- 
ality.    4.  Intentional  finality. 

1.  Subjective  finality.  This  is  Kant's  doctrine  which 
Janet  interprets  to  mean,  that  while  finality  is  a  necessary 
hypothesis  given  the  confirmation  of  the  human  mind, 
nothing  warrants  us  to  suppose  that  this  hypothesis  has  an 
objective  foundation  in  reality.  This  is  simply  the  doctrine 
of  relativity.     Upon  this  we  remark: 

(a.)  If  we  were  under  the  necessity  of  seeing  finality  in 
every  thing,  then  subjective  finality  would  be  the  best 
guarantee  of  objective  finality.  It  would  be  an  a  priori  truth. 
(6.)  But  there  is  no  such  subjective  necessity.  And  since 
e  see  finality  in  some  things  and  not  in  others,  there  must 
be  some  objective  ground  for  this  distinction.  v — 

2.  Immanent  finality. (a^ The  Hegelian  doctrine  affirms 
finality,  but  credits  it  to  the  activity  of  nature  and  denies  a 
personal  God.  Kant  paved  the  way  for  it  by  noticing  two 
important  points  of  distinction  :  First.  That  works  of  art 
and  those  of  nature  differ  in  this  respect,  that  in  the  former 


-j<L^Ji  ( s/ 


39 


the  agent  stands  outside  of  his  work;  while  in  nature  it  is 
different.  Nature  has  a  formative,  reparative  and  repro- 
ductive power  which  distinguishes  her  works  from  those  o1 
human  art.  Secondly.  Kant  made  the  distinction  between 
extrinsic  and  intrinsic  ends.  It  is  by  emphasising  extrinsic 
ends  that  teleology  has  fallen  into  disrepute.  An  organism 
mav  serve  some'  "external  and  extrinsic  purpose  ;  bul  it  is 
itself  the  realisation  of  an  end  in  exhibing  a  certain  type  OJ 
organic  existence.  An  ideal  has  been  realised  in  the  organ- 
ism whatever  external  end  it  may  afterwards  serve.  Hegel 
emphasis^  intrinsic,  or  immanent,  as  opposed  to  extrinsic 
finality.     Upon  this  subject,  we  remark  :     _ 

(a.)  The  Hegelian  doctrine  is  an  unequivocal  concession 
in  favor  of  the  teleological  argument. 

tb)  We  must  distinguish  between  Enality  and  the  caus< 
of  finality.     Hegel  agrees  with  the  Theist .in  affirming  the 
fact.     He  differs  with  him  in  his  explanation  oi  it     Iner 
is  nothing  in  immanent  finality  to  interfere  with   legitimate 
teleology     Theism  is  not  compromised  by  immanence. 

ic)  Though  the  distinction  between  external  and  internal 
ends  he  a  valid  one,  it  is  impossible  always  t„  s,,KU-at,. mm- 
from  the  other.  Our  bodily  organization  is  a  *J«*mco* 
sistino;  of  the  adaptation  oi  part  to  part.  1  he  ey<  is  a  sys- 
Tern  The  several  parts  of  the  body  are  systems.  Each 
ySem  realises  its  end  as  being  a  *1^«5^^ 

body  realises  its  end  as  a  system  only  by  the  ( rdination 

and  adaptation  of  systems  to  each  other. 

(d)  He-el  affirms  that  the  duality  oi  the  world  is  not  con- 
scioui  amTfVee,  but  only  the  activity  of  nature.  Ihis,  how- 
pver   is  not  argument.  .  .    .  , 

3  'Unconscfous  finality.  This  is  the  doct r.ne  of  Seho- 
nenhauer  and  Hartmann,  and  differs  little  from  tha  oi 
SSS  It  admits  the  finality  of  nature  :  affirms  n^gg* 
2  ac counting  for  that  finality,  but  maintain  , ha ;th  i  an 
unconscious  intelligence.  _  Tins  heory  protest ag W«tM 
anthropomorphic  conception  oi  God,  and  givea  us  a  zo 
phic  co nc eption •  Jgjre.  &na]      .g  e(j 

intention    By  so  much  as  the  latter  is  more  rational  by  that 
SSTstheism  more  worthy  of  ou. moderation  than  the 


40 


substitutes  for  it  that  have  been  under  consideration.     The- 
sm  ,s  that  theory  of  the  universe  that  explains  the  adapta- 

intentloS^v6^8  h   *«  ****»  ^  «*  *»<*™  ^ 

Division  II.   Argument  Based  on  Conscience. 

The  word  conscience  stands  for  both  the  ethical  and  the 

religious  side  of  man's  nature.     Accordingly  the  theistic 

proofs  suggested  by  the  word  may  be  considered  under  two 

A.  The  Ethical  Argument. 
Prof.  Flint  does  not  think  that  the  moral  argument  is 
concerned  with  the  questions  now  under  discussion  Regard! 
mg  the  genesis  of  conscience.  His  position  seems  to  be  that 
we  must  choose  between  theism  and  absolute  skepticism 
If  conscience  tells  the  truth  there  is  moral  obligation  and  a 
moral    governor;    if   conscience   does   not    tell    the   truth 

IrlZ  at'Ve  m°rality  is  at  an  end-  Pro,^or  Flint  t 
probably  wrong  in  supposing  that  this  theistic  discussion 
can  ignore  current  debate  on  Ethical  questions. 

I  he  great  topics  of  Ethical  study  are:  1.  Duty:  2    The 
Good;  3.   Virtue.     (Janet.     Moral  Science.)  *' 

I.    Ethical  Argument  Based  on  Idea  op  Duty. 

The  two  ideas  under  duty  are  ought  and  right.     If  these 
ideas  are  ultimate  the  theistic  inference  is  natural.     It 
he  Id  by  some  that  they  are  not  ultimate.     Thus  • 

1.  borne    as   Schopenhauer,   say  there  is   no   legitimate 
£:e'»  et,h,cs  for  th?  word  duty.     It  is  claimed  fffwe 

3  bu thTZ  "  th.6y  "?  tnd  Clas8if-^  them  as  kind  or 

o   iii    -1 1  e  word  ou§ht  has  no  meaning 

Taw  /hIi dea°  °.n?ht  *n<>  "ght  are  held  to  be  derived  from 

vtlu,  life  of  tam)-  .C,0»8c,enCe.i8  a"  imitati0»  in  the  indi- 
™ *  0  °t  the  8,0Clal  forces  without.  A  human  govern- 
ment  is  a  system  of  commands  and  penalties.  Moral  law  is 
derived  from  ,t.  Ought  means  the  expedient.  A  feehngTha 

IroJnt  T'n    °nly    "a.8t.™g  ^nse   of  avoidanceg"-a 
dread  of  penalty.     No  theistic  inference  from  Idea  of  Duty 
it  this  be  correct  view.  •r' 

3   The  Utilitarian  theory.      (Bentham,   Mill.)     Egoistic 
Hedonism  makes  that  conduct  right  which  makes  me  happy? 


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41 

TTriiVersalistic  Hedonism  considers  the  greatest  happiness  of 

the  greatest  number.  To  Egoistic  Hedonist  you  Bay,  "  Con- 
duct can  never  be  obligatory.  It  must  always  be  in  terms 
of  pleasure."  But  to  Universalistic  Hedonist  you  say, 
"  Why  am  I.  bound  to  seek  the  greatest  happiness  of  the 

greatest  number."  He  postulates  obligation  in  the  Utilita- 
rian maxim.  But  he  does  not  explain  it.  Explained  it 
must  be,  however,  if  intuitive  morality  is  to  be  successfully 
attacked. 

Utilitarianism  has  to  settle  first  whether  the  "greatest 
happiness  "  formula  is  a  generalization  expressing  an  altru- 
istic instinct  or  a  generalization  expressing  an  altruistic 
duty.  If  the  former,  it  ignores  the  idea  of  oughtness;  if 
the  latter,  it  postulates.     In  neither  case  does  it  explain  it. 

4.  The  Ethics  of  evolution.  According  to  this  theory, 
morality  is  simply  the  conduct  necessary  to  the  continued 
existence  of  society.  It  may  be  asked,  however,  first  :  bow 
it  happens  that  the  idea  of  obligation  has  been  evolved  in 
connection  with  the  evolution  of  a  morality,  which  is  only 
one  of  expediency.  Second:  what  is  to  be  said  to  the  man 
who  is  told  not  to  do  wrong  because  doing  wrong  will  dam- 
age social  tissue,  if  he  says  that  he  does  not  care  anything 
about  social  tissue?  Evolution  ethics  cannot  be  obligatory  : 
but  evolutionists  cannot  get  rid  of  the  fact  that  the  idea  of 
obligation  is  here. 

The  word  ought  is  a  stumbling  block  in  the  way  of  all 
empirical  thinkers.  We  grant  that  if  ought  could  be  reduced 
to  lower  terms,  it  would  be  hard  to  base  a  theistic  argument 
upon  it.  But  the  attempt  so  to  reduce  it  has  hitherto 
proved  unsuccessful.  The  same  may  be  said  for  the  word 
right.  Oughtness  and  Rightness  are  the  two  irreducible 
words  concerned  in  the  idea  of  duty.  To  what  do  they 
point? 

1.  Some  stop  with  the  consciousness  of  obligation,  and 
see  no  theistic  implications  in  it.  They  recognize  the  cat- 
egorical imperative  as  a  psychological  fact,  without  attempt- 
ing any  metaphysical  inferences. 

2.  Some  say  that  Right  means  conformity  to  the  fitness 
of  things. 

3.  Some  hold  that  there  is  a  principle  of  right  to  which 
God  and  all  moral  things  are  coordinately  related.  / 

4.  Others,  again,  say  that  morality  depends  upon  the 
Divine  will.      ^  4<uJi     vV~x£&Q   ^ry£{ 


3 


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42 

5.  We  believe  that  the  idea  of  oughtness  and  Tightness 
both  witness  to  the  Divine  existence. 

Assuming  that  God  exists  as  a  moral  governor,  these  ideas 
would  be  the  natural  correlatives  of  that  truth.  The  sense 
of  oughtness  would  be  the  natural  correlative  of  man's 
relation  to  God  as  a  moral  governor,  and  the  sense  of  Tight- 
ness the  natural  correlative  to  God  as  the  norm  and  model 
of  his  moral  existence. 

II.    Ethical  Argument  Based  upon  the  Idea  of  the  Good. 

By  the  Good  is  meant  the  Desirable.  What  is  the  rela- 
tion of  Good  to  Duty  ? 

a.  Does  Duty  supersede  the  Good  ?  Is  it  not  possible  to 
have  a  law  of  duty  denning  conduct  and  also  an  unrealized 
ideal  inspiring  it  ?  Duty,  as  a  matter  of  experience,  does 
not  supersede  Good. 

b.  Is  the  Good  subordinated  to  Duty  ?  Can  we  say  the 
desirable  is  doing  Right  ?  Though  Duty  be  regardless  of 
consequences,  consequences  enter  largely  into  the  motives  of 
life.  There  is  in  life  an  aspiration  after  the  ideal  as  well  as 
conformity  to  law. 

c.  Can  the  Dutiful  be  subordinated  to  the  Good  ?  Is 
obligation  conditioned  by  consequences?  Can  we  say  that 
we  ought  to  c]o  right  because  doing  Right  makes  for  our 
highest  happiness?  No.  This  resolves  obligation  into  ex- 
pediency. This  substantially  is  Janet's  system  of  "  rational 
Eu  demon  ism." 

0I,  Duty  and  Good  are  coordinate.  Both  have  place.  What 
then  is  the  Good  ?  What  is  the  Desirable  ?  Is  it  wealth, 
power,  fame,  luxury?  In  short  is  it  pleasure?  Suppose 
with  Descartes  and  others,  we  say  it  is  the  perfection  of  our 
being  and  its  accompanying  happiness,  then  there  is  an  ideal 
that  we  desire  to  realize  ?  There  is  an  ideal  Good.  What 
are  we  to  infer  ? 

The  Pessimist  will  say  that  this  is  the  misery  of  human 
nature  that  it  sighs  after  unrealizable  ideals. 

But  if  we  are  not  pessimists  we  shall  regard  the  irresisti- 
ble idea  of  the  Good  as  prophetic  of  its  realization.  This 
can  only  be  if  we  are  immortal.  Immortality  therefore, 
says  Kant,  is  a  postulate  of  our  moral  nature.  This  can 
only  be  through  the  agency  of  a  purposing  and  all-con- 
trolling Being  who  shapes  all  ends.  God,  says  Kant,  is  the 
postulate  of  our  moral  nature. 


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43 

It  is  hard  to  separate  the  thought  of  an  ideal  Good  as  the 
measure  of  our  perfection  from  that  of  an  Absolute  Good  as 
ot  a  being  who  realizes  in  himself  all  perfection.  See  Janet: 
Moral  Science     Harris:  Philosophical  Basis  oj  Theism. 

\..ajn  •  The  idea  of  Duty  regardless  of  consequences  and 
the  idea  of  the  Good  concerned  altogether  with  consequences 
are  Doth  factors  in  our  moral  life.  They  might  be  in  con- 
aid  Suppose  the  felicific  conduct  were  the  wrong  conduct. 
Suppose  doing  right  always  made  us  miserable.  How  does 
it  happen  that  duty  and  the  good  are  in  such  complete 
accord  ?  We  get  happiness  by  doing  right,  yet  we  are  ool 
to  do  right  tor' the  sake  of  happiness.  Theism  will  accounl 
tor  this  harmony.  We  do  not  know  how  otherwise  it  can  be 
accounted  for.  If  God  proposes  to  bring  about  the  blessed 
perfection  of  the  individual  it  is  not  strange  that  wnal  with 
Him  is  an  end  should  be  foreshadowed  in  man  as  the  good. 
And  if  this  perfection  is  to  be  brought  about  through  per- 
formance of  right  conduct,  it  is  not  strange  there  should  he 
this  harmony  between  Duty  and  Good. 

III.    Ethical  Argument  Based  on  Idea  of  Virtue. 

Dutv   says   what   we  ought  to  do.     The  Good  what  we 
desire"to  become.    Virtue  is  the  realization  of  Duty  m  char- 
acter     Under  the  word   Virtue  we  have  not  the  bare  cate- 
gory Right,  but  the  category  filled  with  content.     AV  e  say 
this  or  that  is  right.     How  has  this  category  of  Right  been 
filled  ?     How,  for  example,  do  we  know  that  truth  telling  is 
right?     Is  it   by   Intuition,  Revelation   or  Evolution?     11 
through  the  first  or  second,  the  theistic  inference  will  not  be 
doubted.     Suppose  it  is  by  the  third.    Then  how  .Ices  it  hap- 
pen that  the  same  process  of  evolution  which  has  Darned  as 
virtues  the  lines  of  conduct  most  promotive  oi  social   well- 
being  has  also  generated  the  feeling  that  well-being  is  not  the 
reason  for  performing  the  conduct.    1  low  dees  it  happen  that 
evolution  has  singled  out  certain  felicific  conduct  as  virtue, 
and  has  also  generated  the  maxim  of  obligation  which  tells 
us  to  do  duty  without  regard  to  happiness.    Eow  doesil  hap- 
pen that  the  natural  history  of  virtue  can  be  written   under 
the  hypothetical  imperative:    -This  is  whai  you  must  do  v) 
you  wish  to  be  happy"';  while  the  maxim  ol  virtue  is  the 
categorical  imperative:  "  Do  this,  cone'  what  may. 

There  are  two  ways  in  which    ethic  of  evolution  may  be 
regarded.     On  the  one  hand,  if  oughtness  and  ru/hlness  be 


44 

solved  into  simpler  constituents,  you  have  no  ethical  atom 
in  either  of  these  words,  and  can  build  no  theistic  argument 
on  them. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  society  has  been  gradually  moving 
from  the  simple  to  the  more  complex,  and  has  developed 
these  ideas  of  duty  and  good,  fundamentally  distinct,  yet  so 
harmonious,  it  is  not  possible  to  account  for  the  development 
of  these  ideas,  their  harmony  and  their  union  in  virtue, 
without  resorting  to  a  teleological  explanation — in  short, 
without  presupposing  God.  The  ethic  of  evolution  does 
not  destroy,  but  it  changes  the  form  of  the  moral  argument. 

B.     The  Religious  Argument. 

Under  this  would  properly  be  discussed:  1.  The  psycho- 
logy of  religion.  2.  The  metaphysical  inferences.  It  would 
appear  that  religion  is  not  exclusively  a  matter  of  intellect, 
feeling  or  life,  but  the  synthesis  of  all.  And  the  inference 
to  a  being  the  objective  counterpart  of  the  universal  reli- 
gious tendency  would  be  the  outcome  of  the  common  argu- 
ment E  consensu  gentium. 

Division  III.     Argument  Based  on  the  Idea  of  the 
Infinite. 

Distinguish  between  (1)  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  and  (2) 
the  theistic  significance  of  the  idea. 

1.  The  idea.  Dr.  McCosh  puts  it  among  the  intuitions. 
Locke  and  empirical  philosophers  generally  account  for  it 
by  exercise  of  imagination  in  connection  with  experience  of 
the  finite.  But  whatever  the  conditions  under  which  the 
idea  emerges  as  a  fact  of  consciousness,  it  complies  with  the 
canons  of  intuitionalism.  The  idea  is  not  limited  in  appli- 
cation to  time  and  space.  We  cannot  conceive  of  any  degree 
of  knowledge  as  exhausting  the  knowable.  We  speak  of 
infinite  truth,  holiness,  justice.  So  used,  the  word  infinite 
does  not  differ  much  from  the  perfect  or  the  absolute.  We 
cannot  realise  dependent,  finite,  contingent  existence  with- 
out thinking  of  infinite,  perfect,  absolute  existence.  We 
cannot  conceive  the  infinite  in  the  sense  of  making  a  mental 
image  of  it.  On  the  other  hand  and  in  another  sense,  we 
cannot  help  conceiving  of  it. 


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45 

2.     Its  Theistic  Significance. 

1.  Schelling  taught  that  the  infinite  or  absolute  is  imme- 
diately known.  This  view  was  repeated  by  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  who  showed  that  according  to  the  definitions  of 
the  words  absolute  and  infinite,  the  infinite  cannot  know  and 
cannot  be  known  ;  cannot,  because  that  a  knowing  absolute 
and  a  know     absolute,  is  no  absolute  at  all. 

2.  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  Nescience.  See  Dr.  Eodge'a 
chapter,  Can  God  be  Known  f  Hamilton  tries  to  show  that 
we  can  have  no  knowledge  of  God ;  that  we  must  take  our' 
choice  between  inconceivables,  with  the  assurance  that  these 
inconceivables  being  contradictory  propositions,  one  or  the 
other  must  be  true;  and  having  made  it  easy  for  us  by  his 
law  of  the  conditioned  to  believe  the  inconceivable,  he  tried 
to  make  up  for  our  lack  of  knowledge  by  logical  vindication 
of  our  faith.  Mansel  followed  in  his  Limits  of  Religious 
Thought,  designed  to  be  a  new  apologetic,  and  intended  to 
show  that  the  difficulties  of  theology  are  only  those  of  all 
thought,  that  since  we  must  believe  the  inconceivable  in 
philosophy,  we  may  believe  the  inconceivable  in  theology. 
The  most  popular  application  of  the  Hamiltonian  philosophy 
is  not  found  in  Mansel's  apologetic,  but  in  Spencer's  agnos- 
ticism. 

3.  Dr.  Calderwood  holds  that  we  have  an  intuitive  knowl- 
edge of  an  infinite  personal  God.  He  cannot  be  said  to 
have  succeeded.  Men  do  not  have  the  same  sort  of  intuitive 
belief  in  an  infinite  God  that  they  do  in  regard  to  time  and 
space,  or  there  would  be  no  atheists. 

4.  We  do  not  immediately  know  the  Infinite.  Nov  is  it 
true  that  we  cannot  think  of  the  Infinite  except  under  con- 
tradictory attributes.  Nor  do  we  have  an  intuitive  and 
necessary  belief  in  the  objective  existence  of  an  infinite 
Being.  Nevertheless  the  idea  of  the  infinite  is  an  import- 
ant factor  in  theistic  inference.  We  have  this  idea.  It 
emerges  in  connection  with  every  experience  of  what  is 
finite  and  relative.  It  is  involved  in  every  degree  of  empir- 
ical excellence,  as  the  norm  or  standard  of  excellence.  We 
cannot  think  of  Right  or  Good  without  thinking  of  an  ab- 
solute norm  or  standard.  The  infinite  or  absolute  is  another 
word  for  the  ideal.  What  interpretation  shall  we  put  upon 
this  ideal  ?  The  question  is  not  how  we  get  it,  but  what 
itjineans.     We  believe  that  it  is  a  strong  confirmation  of 


46 


the  theistic  view  of  the  world,  partly  because  of  the  large 
place  it  holds  in  the  huma,,  mind  and  partly  too  because  of 
the  inev  able  impression  into  which  we  fall  if  we  conclude 
here  is  no  objective  norm,  no  absolute  standard  by  which 
all  upward  growth  is  measured,  by  which  all  relat.ve  truth 
and  goodness  is  judged.  ^ 


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